Operation Northwoods

Document Collection

e-book collection of documents relating to false-flag covert operations against Cuba

edited by Tom Secker
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Introduction

This collection of nearly 100 pages of declassified papers reveals the history surrounding the notorious Operation Northwoods. The Northwoods plan called for US military and intelligence agents to carry out a series of false flag attacks, including terrorist attacks in US cities. The events would be blamed on Cuba as an excuse for a military intervention. Though most aspects of the plan were never carried out, the history of how and why the operation was put together is fascinating and highly significant.

In April 1961 an army of Cuban refugees invaded Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. They were armed, trained and equipped by the CIA, in an attempted coup d’etat against Fidel Castro. ‘The Beard’ had come to power in 1959, but relations between the US and Cuba quickly fell apart. A fuller account of the Bay of Pigs operation is the subject of a forthcoming e-book in this series.

Most importantly for the story told in this book, the invasion failed. The proxy army of refugees were either killed or captured. Out of this failure came Operation Mongoose – a much larger covert operation aimed at destabilising the Castro government before attempting to overthrow it. Northwoods was one particular twist in the history of Operation Mongoose, itself only one chapter in the history of US relations with Cuba during this period.

What these documents show is where Northwoods came from, both historically and operationally. They explain not only the Northwoods plan itself but also the psychological motivation and modus operandi of covert false flag attacks. Taking the documents in turn:


This historical review of the failed Bay of Pigs operation was written by Marine Corps Colonel Jack Hawkins, who was seconded to the CIA in 1960 to help run the operation. The full report details the operation itself, the decision-making process that led up to it, and the reasons why it failed. The conclusions presented here provided the rationale for the followup Mongoose operation.

Hawkins reasoned that ‘the Government and the people of the United States are not yet psychologically conditioned to participate in the cold war with resort to the harsh, rigorous and often dangerous and painful measures which must be taken in order to win... the resort to war-like measure in any situation short of all-out war is repugnant to the American mentality. In order to win the cold war, this inhibition must be overcome.’
In other words, the repugnance felt by the American public when they found out about the dirty tricks employed in the Bay of Pigs invasion were seen as an obstacle to the CIA continuing to carry out such operations.

Hawkins also noted that the CIA were poorly equipped for the task of carrying out medium-scale covert operations, and suggested that responsibility for such operations be turned over to the Department for Defense. He emphasised that covert action alone would not be sufficient to overthrow the Castro regime, indeed, that nothing short of ‘overt application of elements of United State military power’ would do the job.

Both of these issues – the turning over of responsibility for covert action to the Pentagon, and the requirement of using military power to overthrow Castro, were crucial in leading to the Northwoods plan.


These National Security Action Memos came only weeks after the Hawkins report, and followed up on his recommendations. The third memo in particular redefined Responsibility for Paramilitary Operations, saying that, ‘Any large paramilitary operation wholly or partly covert which requires significant numbers of military trained personnel, amounts to military equipment which exceed normal CIA-controlled stocks and/or military experience of a kind and level peculiar to the Armed services is properly the primary responsibility of the Department of Defense with the CIA in a supporting role.’

After more than a decade of the CIA having primary responsibility for covert paramilitary operations, this memo effectively ordered that the Pentagon take over the role. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco Kennedy had publicly taken responsibility but privately resented the CIA for what he saw as their deceiving him. Kennedy fired Allen Dulles, Richard Bissell and Charles Cabell and issued NSAM 57 in a political attack on the Agency, the like of which has not been seen before or since. There are of course those who believe this was one of the primary motives for Kennedy’s assassination a couple of years later.

*Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, re: Meeting with the Attorney General of the United States concerning Cuba, Richard Helms, 19th January 1962* – source: [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/620119%20Meeting%20with%20the%20Attorney%20Gen..pdf](http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/620119%20Meeting%20with%20the%20Attorney%20Gen..pdf)
This memo details a meeting between the Attorney General Robert Kennedy and several men from the CIA and US military. Kennedy explained how after the Bay of Pigs failure a policy of 'laying low' was implemented for a time regarding Cuba. However, in the autumn of 1961, Brigadier General Ed Lansdale had been tasked with surveying the issue and determining what could be done. Discussions at the meeting outlined how Lansdale had concluded that overthrowing Castro was possible, and that a series of smaller-scale covert actions should be undertaken to keep the Cuban government busy so it could not ‘meddle’ in Latin America. Kennedy gave his assent to the proposals, though overt military intervention was not discussed.


Less than two weeks after that meeting, Lansdale drew up a detailed set of covert plans designed to ‘Provoke, Harass or Disrupt Cuba’. They are worth considering in some detail.

Several involved sabotage, an age-old method of covert agents. Everything from cars to communications facilities were targeted. Several involved psychological warfare, aimed at reducing support for Castro, or inducing defectors and refugees. One of the most famous plans, codenamed Dirty Trick, was based around the Mercury flight of John Glenn, the first American to orbit the earth. The plan said that if anything went wrong with the flight, that Cuba would be blamed using manufactured evidence.

The 10th plan, Operation Bingo, was the prototype for what would become the Northwoods plan. It suggested that the US government, ‘create an incident which has the appearance of an attack on U.S. facilities (GMO) in Cuba, thus providing an excuse for use of U.S. military might to overthrow the current government of Cuba.’ Over the following weeks, this plan would be refined and expanded.

Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, and attached Cover and Deception Plans, 19th February 1962 – source: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/620219%20Memo%20for%20the%20Chief%20of%20Ops..pdf

This cover and deception plan details several ideas for military exercises in the Caribbean that would have a psychological warfare effect on both Cuban citizens and the Castro government. These ideas would eventually find their way into the Northwoods documents, and the notion of military/security drills and exercises being used as elements in black operations has gained a lot of attention and currency in recent years.
The plan states that the exercises should be used to (1) ‘create the required psychological build-up of the desired atmosphere in Cuba’, i.e. convince Castro and his supporters that the US were really planning to invade, and to scare the Cuban general public as a means of destabilising the government; (2) ‘gain the necessary favourable preposition US military posture to counter a possible hostile Cuban reaction’, i.e. have forces in strategically useful positions should Castro be so perturbed by the exercises that he order an attack; and (3) ‘then lure or provoke Castro, or an uncontrollable subordinate, into an overt hostile reaction against the United States; a reaction which would in turn create the justification for the US to not only retaliate but destroy Castro’, i.e. fool Castro into a hostile act that the US could then use as an excuse to attack Cuba.

Program Review, Cuba Project by Brigadier General Ed Lansdale, 20th February 1962

Overall review of the Cuba Project (Operation Mongoose) by Lansdale, written just after the cover and deception plan. Among these 26 pages is an outline for how to sponsor a guerrilla force and overthrow a government – a plan that might even have worked in Cuba had the Soviets not intervened and caused the Missile Crisis.

The review makes it clear that the debate about whether or not to use overt US military force was still raging. Lansdale asked, ‘if conditions and assets permitting a revolt are achieved in Cuba, and if U.S. help is required to sustain this condition, will the U.S. respond promptly with military force to aid the Cuban revolt?’

Report by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative on the Carribean Survey Group to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Cuba Project, 9th March 1962 – source: http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?absPageId=159978

This report contains an early draft of the memo (below) that was sent to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara a few days later. The report summarises the military exercise tactic outlined in the cover and deception report, saying, ‘Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasised. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.

The report also notes in Enclosure B that ‘US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile
acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident on which to base overt intervention.
In other words, in handing over the responsibility for covert action against Cuba from the CIA to the Pentagon, in the context of the belief that only full-scale military intervention could topple Castro, Kennedy had presented the Joint Chiefs with something of a paradox. They attempted to resolve that paradox by covertly provoking the Cubans into 'hostile acts', which would then serve as a pretext for war against Castro.


The most widely-known Northwoods document, sent from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense. It outlines a series of pretexts that the US could use as their excuse for overt military intervention in Cuba. This included faking an attack on Guantanamo bay, the false-flag bombing of an airliner, mock victims and acts of real terrorism in US cities, all of which would ultimately be blamed on Cuba.


Three days after McNamara had been sent the Northwoods memo, a meeting took place between Kennedy, McNamara, chairman of the Joint Chiefs Lyman Lemnitzer, Ed Lansdale and others. Lemnitzer brought up the question of pretexts for war but clearly Kennedy was not impressed with the Northwoods plan. The memo details how, 'General Lemnitzer commented that the military had contingency plans for US intervention. Also it had plans for creating plausible pretexts to use force, with the pretext either attacks on US aircraft or a Cuban action in Latin America for which we could retaliate. The President said bluntly that we were not discussing the use of military force, that General Lemnitzer might find the U.S so engaged in Berlin or elsewhere that he couldn't use the contemplated 4 divisions in Cuba.’


After the apparent rejection of the Northwoods plan for a pretext for war, the Joint Chiefs became more hawkish in their assessments. This memo to McNamara outlines their view that, 'the Cuban problem must be solved in the
near future,’ and that, ‘military intervention by the United States will be required.’

The memo concludes that, ‘the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a national policy of early military intervention in Cuba be adopted by the United States. They also recommend that such intervention under as soon as possible.’

The US military chiefs saying to their political masters that they should carry out terrorist attacks to justify a war was a radical step. The Northwoods plan is among the most explicit ever declassified. This collection of documents, taken together and in context, show that the radical step was motivated by abject paranoia about the influence of Castro on Latin America. The military could not abide a Communist government just off the coast of Florida. But due to the failure at the Bay of Pigs a pre-emptive strike was considered impossible. Going back to Hawkins’ original assessment, the US government and public weren’t ready for an aggressive strike against a tiny, non-threatening neighbour, no matter their ideology. In order to bridge the gap and psychologically condition the public to accept such a war of aggression, deception and ultimately false flag tactics were seen as required.

Though this set of circumstances might seem unique, consider the build-up to the war in Iraq in late 2002 and early 2003. Fake defectors, false intelligence, and blaming Iraq for anything and everything that was happening in the world were used to create a groundswell of public opinion in favour of war. Or consider 9/11, an event many believe to be the largest-scale false flag terrorist attack of all time, exploited and used as a pretext for ongoing and expanding wars in the Middle East.
tactical principles must be regarded as primarily responsible for failure of the amphibious operation.)

b. The Department of State was the principal advocate of the restrictions listed above. The rationale of these self-imposed restrictions rested upon what proved to be an unrealistic requirement, impossible of fulfillment under the circumstances, to conduct operations in such a way as to be non-attributable to the United States, or, at least, plausibly deniable. In the interest of non-attributability, the requirement for operational effectiveness was so completely subordinated that the end result was "too little, too late", and the United States had to bear publicly the responsibility for a failure rather than the responsibility for a success. The price paid by the United States in terms of public clamor by our enemies was high enough to have covered the cost of additional measures that could have been taken to ensure success. It seemed to this writer through the many months of this effort, that the United States was trying to achieve a very important objective at a very small cost to itself, while it would have been in the national interest to act more boldly and openly and accept more risks as might be necessary to ensure that every needed measure would be taken to win the objective, which had to be won, and still must be won, and soon, if all Latin America is not to be lost to Communism.

27. CONCLUSIONS. The following conclusions are based upon my experiences of the past eight months as Chief of the Paramilitary Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency Cuba Project:

a. The Government and the people of the United States are not yet psychologically conditioned to participate in the cold war with resort to the harsh, rigorous, and often dangerous and painful measures which must be taken in order to win. Our history and tradition have conditioned us for all-out war or all-out peace, and the resort to war-like measures in any situation short of all-out war is repugnant to the American mentality. In order to win the cold war, this inhibition must be overcome.
b. In a cold war paramilitary operation, there is a basic conflict of interest between considerations of military effectiveness on the one hand and political considerations on the other. Since in the cold war national survival does not seem to be immediately at issue (although this writer would deem that it is), political considerations tend to dominate, with the result that military measures are progressively restricted and subordinated. Experiences of the past few years indicate that political restrictions on military measures may result in destroying the effectiveness of the latter, and the end result is political embarrassment coupled with military failure and loss of prestige in the world.

c. Paramilitary operations cannot be effectively conducted on a ration-card basis. Therefore, if political considerations are such as to prohibit the application of all military measures required to achieve the objective, then military operations should not be undertaken.

d. Civilian officials of the Government should not attempt to prescribe the tactics of military or paramilitary operations.

e. For an effort of the kind made against Cuba, detailed policy guidance, in writing, is required from the national level. A national plan should be written at the outset, setting forth the responsibilities and tasks of every Department and Agency concerned. An organization must be provided for directing and coordinating the actions by all Departments and Agencies in the economic, political, psychological and military fields.

f. In pursuing an operation of the kind conducted against Cuba, governmental machinery must be established for prompt, decisive resolution of policy questions as they arise.

g. Paramilitary operations of any appreciable size cannot be conducted on a completely covert basis, and the requirement for non-attributability introduces tremendous complications in the accomplishment of what would otherwise be simple tasks. Since paramilitary operations on an increasing
scale will probably be required as we face years of cold war in the future, the United States should be prepared to operate more boldly and overtly in this field, as do our enemies of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

g. The Central Intelligence Agency does not have required organization, equipment, procedures, bases, facilities nor staff for the planning and conduct of paramilitary operations. It cannot conduct such operations without relying heavily upon the Department of Defense for personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities, and other support.

i. Primary responsibility for all paramilitary matters, including the organization, equipping, training, operational employment and support of indigenous guerrilla forces, should be assigned to the Department of Defense, which has vast human and material resources and proper organization and procedures for accomplishment of these functions.

j. All military operations of any kind, including those of a paramilitary nature, should be under the direction and control of the Unified Commander in whose area the operations are to take place. It would be advisable to form a special task force within the Unified Command, with representation from Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and C.I.A. as required, for conduct of paramilitary operations.

k. Within the Department of Defense, the responsibility for ground paramilitary matters should be assigned to the Army Special Forces, since these forces are especially trained and organized for such missions.

I. It would be advisable for all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to attend meetings with the President and Cabinet Officers at which any military matters are to be discussed. It cannot be expected that any single military officer can advise adequately on all the technical aspects of air, sea, and ground warfare. The Cuban operation was essentially a seaborne invasion. Such operations are a specialty of the Navy and Marine Corps. Therefore, the Chief
of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, if present at all meetings, would have been able to contribute invaluable advice at the proper time.

m. A Communist-style police state is now firmly entrenched in Cuba, which will not be overthrown by means short of overt application of elements of United States military power. Further efforts to develop armed internal resistance, or to organize Cuban exile forces, should not be made except in connection with a planned overt intervention by United States forces.

J. HAWKINS
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 58

TO: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Relations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President in Cold War Operations

I wish to inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff as follows with regard to my views of their relations to me in Cold War Operations:

a. I regard the Joint Chiefs of Staff as my principal military advisor responsible both for initiating advice to me and for responding to requests for advice. I expect their advice to come to me direct and unfiltered.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have a responsibility for the defense of the nation in the Cold War similar to that which they have in conventional hostilities. They should know the military and paramilitary forces and resources available to the Department of Defense, verify their readiness, report on their adequacy, and make appropriate recommendations for their expansion and improvement. I look to the Chiefs to contribute dynamic and imaginative leadership in contributing to the success of the military and paramilitary aspects of Cold War programs.

c. I expect the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present the military viewpoint in governmental councils in such a way as to assure that the military factors are clearly understood before decisions are reached. When only the Chairman or a single Chief is present, that officer must represent the Chiefs as a body, taking such preliminary and subsequent actions as may be necessary to assure that he does in fact represent the corporate judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. While I look to the Chiefs to present the military factor without reserve or hesitation, I regard them to be more than military men and expect their help in fitting military requirements into the over-all context of any situation, recognizing that the most difficult problem in Government is to combine all assets in a unified, effective pattern.

cc: Secretary of Defense
    General Taylor

cc: Mrs. Lincoln
    Mr. Smith
    McG. Bundy's file
SECRET

June 28, 1961

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 56

TO: The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Paramilitary Requirements

The President has approved the following paragraph:

"It is important that we anticipate now our possible future requirements in the field of unconventional warfare and paramilitary operations. A first step would be to inventory the paramilitary assets we have in the United States Armed Forces, consider various areas in the world where the implementation of our policy may require indigenous paramilitary forces, and thus arrive at a determination of the goals which we should act in this field. Having determined the assets and the possible requirements, it would then become a matter of developing a plan to meet the deficit."

The President requests that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Department of State and the CIA, make such an estimate of requirements and recommend ways and means to meet these requirements.

McGeorge Bundy

cc: Secretary of State
Director, CIA
General Maxwell D. Taylor
June 24, 1961

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 57

TO: The Secretary of State
    The Secretary of Defense
    The Director, CIA

The President has approved the attached recommendation:

The Special Group (5412 Committee) will perform the functions
assigned in the recommendation to the Strategic Resources
Group.

McGeorge Bundy

cc: General Maxwell D. Taylor

cc: Mrs. Lincoln
    Mr. Smith
    Mr. McG. Bundy file
TO: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Relations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President in Cold War Operations

I wish to inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff as follows with regard to my views of their relations to me in Cold War Operations:

a. I regard the Joint Chiefs of Staff as my principal military advisor responsible both for initiating advice to me and for responding to requests for advice. I expect their advice to come to me direct and unfiltered.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have a responsibility for the defense of the nation in the Cold War similar to that which they have in conventional hostilities. They should know the military and paramilitary forces and resources available to the Department of Defense, verify their readiness, report on their accuracy, and make appropriate recommendations for their expansion and improvement. I look to the Chiefs to contribute dynamic and imaginative leadership in contributing to the success of the military and paramilitary aspects of Cold War programs.

c. I expect the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present the military viewpoint in governmental councils in such a way as to assure that the military factors are clearly understood before decisions are reached. When only the Chairman or a single Chief is present, that officer must represent the Chiefs as a body, taking such preliminary and subsequent actions as may be necessary to assure that he does in fact represent the corporate judgement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. While I look to the Chiefs to represent the military factor without reserve or hesitation, I regard them to be more than military men and expect their help in fitting military requirements into the over-all context of any situation, recognizing that the most difficult problem in Government is to combine all assets in a unified, effective pattern.

[signature of John Kennedy]

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General Taylor
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McGeorge Bundy

cc: Secretary of State
    Director, CIA
    General Maxwell D. Taylor
June 28, 1961

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 57

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, CIA

The President has approved the attached recommendation:

The Special Group (5412 Committee) will perform the functions assigned in the recommendation to the Strategic Resources Group.

McGeorge Bundy

cc: General Maxwell D. Taylor

cc: Mrs. Lincoln
Mr. Smith
Mr. McG. Bundy file
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS

1. For the purpose of this study, a paramilitary operation is considered to be one which by its tactics and its requirements in military-type personnel, equipment and training approximates a conventional military operation. It may be undertaken in support of an existing government friendly to the U.S. or in support of a rebel group seeking to overthrow a government hostile to us. The U.S. may render assistance to such operations overtly, covertly or by a combination of both methods. In size these operations may vary from the infiltration of a squad of guerillas to a military operation such as the Cuban invasion. The small operations will often fall completely within the normal capability of one agency; the large ones may affect State, Defense, CIA, USIA and possibly other departments and agencies.

2. In order to conduct paramilitary operations with maximum effectiveness and flexibility within the context of the Cold War, it is recommended that current directives and procedures be modified to effect the following:

   a. Any proposed paramilitary operation in the concept state will be presented to the Strategic Resources Group for initial consideration and for approval as necessary by the President. Thereafter, the SRG will assign primary responsibility for planning, for interdepartment coordination and for execution to the Task Force, department or individual best qualified to carry forward the operation to success, and will indicate supporting responsibilities. Under this principle, the Department of Defense will normally receive responsibility for overt paramilitary operations. Where such an operation is to be wholly covert or disavowable, it may be assigned to CIA, provided that it is within the normal capabilities of the agency. Any large paramilitary operation wholly or partly covert which requires significant numbers of military trained personnel, amounts to military equipment which exceed normal CIA-controlled stocks and/or military experience of a kind and level peculiar to the Armed services is properly the primary responsibility of the Department of Defense with the CIA in a supporting role.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Meeting with the Attorney General of the United States Concerning Cuba

1. I attended a meeting on Cuba at 11:00 A.M., today chaired by the Attorney General. Others present were:

   Brig. General E. S. Lansdale (OSD)
   Major James Patchell (OSD)
   Brig. General William H. Craig (JCS)
   Mr. [redacted] (CIA)
   Mr. George McManus (CIA)

   (The Department of State was not represented although invited.)

2. The Attorney General outlined to us "How it all started", findings as they developed, and the general framework within which the United States Government should now attack the Cuban problem. Briefly, these were the main points:

   (a) After failure of the invasion, the United States Government became less active on the theory "better to lay low".

   (b) Over the months the complexion of the refugee flow changed (i.e. upper classes out first, then middle classes -- dropping to lower middle class, etc.) which, he stated, indicated a strong feeling of opposition to Castro within Cuba.

   (c) Progress in Cuba toward a police and Communist state was more rapid during this period than that made by any country in Eastern Europe in an equivalent period of time. Because of the rapidity of advance, immediate action on the part of the United States Government was necessary.
(d) With these factors in mind, the Attorney General had a discussion at the White House during the autumn of 1961 with the President, the Secretary of Defense, and General Lansdale. The Secretary of Defense assigned General Lansdale to survey the Cuban problem, and he (Lansdale) reported to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Attorney General (in late November) concluding:

(1) Overthrow of Castro regime was possible

(2) Sugar crop should be attacked at once

(3) Action to be taken to keep Castro so busy with internal problems (economic, political, and social) that Castro would have no time for meddling abroad especially in Latin America.

DETAIL: United States Government was precluded from destroying the current sugar crop (1) we were late and overly optimistic and (b) "the assets of the United States Government were not as great as we were led to believe".

(e) Accordingly, a solution to the Cuban problem today carries "The top priority in the United States Government -- all else is secondary -- no time, money, effort, or manpower is to be spared. There can be no misunderstanding on the involvement of the agencies concerned nor on their responsibility to carry out this job. The agency heads understand that you are to have full backing on what you need."

(f) Yesterday (18 January 1962), the President indicated to the Attorney General that "the final chapter on Cuba has not been written" -- it's got to be done and will be done.

(g) Therefore, the Attorney General directed those in attendance at the meeting to address
themselves to the "32 tasks" unfailingly
(see program review - The Cuba Project
dated 18 January 1962). He said, "It is
not only General Lansdale's job to put the
tasks, but yours to carry out with every
resource at your command."

3. The Attorney General inquired about the progress in
establishing a refugee interrogation center at Miami and was
informed that this would be in operation by 15 February 1962 --
the target date. With respect to interrogating the back-log
of Cubans in the U. S. A., we agreed that we would attack this
problem by getting at the more recent arrivals first. The
Attorney General was informed that one could not relate, in
time, the establishment of an interrogation facility with the
placing of agents in Cuba -- in other words, a body of informa-
tion would have to be developed by intensive interrogation of
many sources over a period of time.

4. It was General Lansdale's view that there were several
tasks among the "32" outlined upon which action could be taken
without awaiting this detailed intelligence information. He
noted, for example, the defection of top Cubans as being within
the immediate capabilities of the CIA.

Richard Helms
Chief of Operations, DD/P
POSSIBLE ACTIONS TO PROVOKE, HARRASS, OR DISRUPT

-CUBA-

1. **Operation SMASHER**:
   a. **Objective**: The objective is to disrupt/disable military and commercial communications facilities in Cuba.
   b. **Concept**: This to be accomplished by the clandestine introduction of a "special" vacuum tube into selected communications equipment. The tube, which is available, is virtually undetectable inasmuch as its effectiveness is due to the insertion of a chemical compound in the base of the tube. The chemical, when heated becomes a conductor, when cool a non-conductor.

2. **Operation FREE RIDE**:
   a. **Objective**: The objective is to create unrest and disension amongst the Cuban people.
   b. **Concept**: This to be accomplished by airdropping valid Pan American or KLM one-way airline tickets good for passage to Mexico City, Caracas, etc. (none to the U.S.). Tickets could be intermixed with other leaflets planned to be dropped. The number of tickets dropped could be increased. The validity of the tickets would have to be restricted to a time period.

3. **Operation TURN ABOUT**:
   a. **Objective**: The objective is to create indications to Fidel Castro that his value to the revolutionary cause has diminished to the point where plans are being made for his "removal".
   b. **Concept**: This to be accomplished by the use of intelligence means the crescendo increasing until it culminates in Castro's discovery of the mechanism or hardware.

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4. **Operation DEFECTOR:**

   a. **Objective:** To induce elements or individuals of the Cuban military to defect with equipment.

   b. **Concept:** This activity when properly planned and implemented has the effect of decreasing military capability. In a totalitarian system the immediate reaction is increased security accompanied by decreased activity. It also creates havoc in security and intelligence agencies. Could be accomplished by intelligence means and promise of rewards.

5. **Operation BREAK-UP:**

   a. **Objective:** To clandestinely introduce corrosive materials to cause aircraft, vehicle or boat accidents.

   b. **Concept:** This activity, if possible should be aimed primarily toward the Soviet-provided aircraft. If properly accomplished it would degrade confidence in the equipment, increase supply and maintenance problems and seriously affect combat capability.

6. **Operation COVER-UP:**

   a. **Objective:** The objective is to convince the Communist government of Cuba that Naval Forces ostensibly assigned to the MERCURY project is merely a cover.

   b. **Concept:** It should not be revealed as to what the cover is--this should be left to conjecture. This could tie in with Operation DIRTY TRICK.

7. **Operation DIRTY TRICK:**

   a. **Objective:** The objective is to provide irrevocable proof that, should the MERCURY manned orbit flight fail, the fault lies with the Communists et al Cuba.

   b. **Concept:** This to be accomplished by manufacturing various pieces of evidence which would prove electronic interference on the part of the Cubans.

8. **Operation FULL-UP:**

   a. **Objective:** The objective is to destroy confidence in fuel supplied by the Soviet Bloc by indicating it is contaminated.
b. Concept: This to be accomplished by introducing a known biological agent into jet fuel storage facilities. This agent flourishes in jet fuel and grows until it consumes all the space inside the tank.

9. **Operation PHANTOM:**

a. Objective: The objective is to convince the Castro Government that clandestine penetration and resupply of agents is being regularly conducted.

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by use of BJ, UDT, AND JJ capabilities to create the impression that landings have been made on beaches and air drops have been made in other areas.

10. **Operation BINGO:**

a. Objective: The objective is to create an incident which has the appearance of an attack on U.S. facilities (GMO) in Cuba, thus providing the excuse for use of U.S. military might to overthrow the current government of Cuba.

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the use of SNAKES outside the confines of the Guantanamo Base. SNAKES simulate an actual fire-fight and upon hearing such a sound it is entirely feasible that the immediate reaction on G'Mo would be that the base is being attacked. This would, with proper preparation, be followed by a counterattack and with adequate planning the base at G'Mo could disgorge military force in sufficient number to sustain itself until other forces, which had been previously alerted, could attack in other areas. It is envisaged that a schedule of operations similar to the following would overwhelm the Cuban military and cause its defeat:

1. Simulated attack on Guantanamo.
2. Word flashed to the President.
3. President orders counterattack to include:
   a. Immediate launch of alerted aircraft whose targets are Cuban airfields.
   b. Immediate launch of counterattack down strategic lines in communication in Cuba.
   c. Fleet force standing by on alert would make way toward pre-selected targets/landing areas.
   d. Immediate embarkation of airborne troops previously alerted to pre-selected targets.
   e. Launch of additional combat aircraft to clear drop areas and further interdict lines of communication.
   f. Ships and aircraft would land/airdrop troops and secure airfields, road/rail terminals, etc.
(g) Resupply and replacement activities.

Properly executed, the above could overthrow the Cuban Government in a matter of hours, providing the plan is implemented within the next six months.

11. Operation GOOD TIMES:

a. Objective: To disillusion the Cuban population with Castro image by distribution of fake photographic material.

b. Concept: Prepare a desired photograph, such as an obese Castro with two beauties in any situation desired, ostensibly within a room in the Castro residence, lavishly furnished, and a table brimming over with the most delectable Cuban food with an underlying caption (appropriately Cuban) such as "My ration is different." Make as many prints as desired on sterile paper and then distribute over the countryside by air drops or agents. This should put even a Commie Dictator in the proper perspective with the underprivileged masses.

12. Operation HEAT IS ON:

a. Objective: To create the impression with Castro Government that certain dyed-in-the-wool Red pilots are planning to defect, thus causing a detrimental tightening of security.

b. Concept: It is known that many Cuban refugee pilots are personally acquainted with many of the present Craf pilots. Accordingly, by utilizing all sources available, determine by name those pilots considered to be dedicated Castro Reds. Then by use of agents, communications, etc. inject into the Castro intelligence system the fact that these pre-designated Reds are planning to defect for monetary and/or ideological reasons. Security crackdown should help destroy Castro image and also impose unacceptable restrictions on routine training activities.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT

Subject: Tasks 33c and 33d

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Mr. Gilpatric have approved the attached plans responsive to Tasks 33c and 33d. This completes our action on these Tasks.

WILLIAM H. CRAIG
Brig General, USA
DOD/JCS Representative
Caribbean Survey Group

Enclosure:
a/s

10002
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

Subject: Cover and Deception Plans for Caribbean Survey Group (Working Group) Tasks 33c and 33d

1. In accordance with instructions, an Outline Cover and Deception (C&D) Plan for an Air/Sea exercise in the vicinity of Cuba (Caribbean Survey Group (CSG) Working Group (WG)) Task 33c, and an Alternative C&D Plan, CSG (WG) Task 33d, are attached.

2. The purpose of these plans is to develop the mission, the tasks, the basic concepts, and an outline of sequential events only in sufficient detail that the Unified and Specified Commanders, and supporting command concerned, will be able to develop their supporting plans in detailed form to ensure accomplishment of the objectives.

3. Determination of tentative execution dates for either plan and the exercises involved therein has been the most enigmatic, indeterminate single problem due to the many timing factors involved. With the surgar harvest during the period 15 January through 15 April, with the most critical period between 1 February and 1 April, it is desirable that any C&D plan be designed to cause a reaction of great enough magnitude to include a call-up of the militia or a complete disruption of the available labor force. Therefore, it must be capable of execution either at the beginning of the harvest period, or at least no later than a date when the harvest is in full swing. Yet, to accomplish this disruption, the C&D plan must be credible to the extent that it will produce an aura of fear of a US invasion within Cuba through a gradual build-up of psychological harassment before culminating in an action which should clearly indicate that the use of military action is a determined intent of the US; an action which must have a provocative climax strong enough to produce a Cuban mobilization. Thus, while a series of US military actions may only engender the psychological build-up and perhaps assist in the development
of a fear of the US, this series of build-up actions is considered necessary, if the credibility of the climax is to be achieved.

4. Similarly, if the climatic exercise, or concurrent exercises, are to be sufficiently provocative to cause the desired Cuban mobilization, then the US must be in the best possible military position in order to be able to immediately and decisively counter any overt Cuban military reaction; either ordered by Castro or resulting from an irrational act by an uncontrollable subordinate. Therefore, the psychological build-up period also must be used to place the US in favorable position through prepositioning of forces, marshalling of lift, or general preparations before culminating in the climatic C&W exercise to be executed. Ergo, both the psychological build-up and the US military preparatory activities, including the detailed planning involved take time. It is considered that a period of thirty days from the date of a policy decision until the execution day of any C&W plan is an absolute minimum.

5. Accordingly, while the attached C&W plans indicate a tentative execution date of 14 March 1962, certain implementing actions would be required by 12 February, hence, this date can no longer be met and the exercises involved will encounter slippage; which, in turn, will place any possible date of execution well into the last one-third of the 1962 harvest season, if not at the very end of this period.

6. Additional timing factors should also be noted. It is a hard fact that any exercises of this scope either meshed with or superimposed over other exercises currently in planning stages or in projected future exercise schedules will have broad implications. In this connection, while not a complete list due to the time allowed for the development of the C&W Plan and the closeness with which the Task 33c and 33d projects must be held, a study of exercises which might affect timing
is appended hereto as Tab A. Although certain of these have
been considered desirable and applicable for inclusion in
the over-all C&G planning considerations by the CSG (WG),
it is important to note that any additional inexplicable
cancellations, advancement or retardation of exercise dates
might create consternation, bewilderment and endless questions;
unless, of course, an adequate cover story, i.e., a world-
wide US exercise, is also developed. It is equally true,
however, that mere cancellation of some exercises in favor
of the C&G plan might make Castro slightly nervous by
indicating that the US might mean business.

7. Although only a partial listing of the major exercises
now scheduled, Tab A gives an indication of the complexity
of the disruption the execution of basic Task 33c would create
in the US military training schedule. In short, execution
of either plan would require all of the Services to concentrate
only on preparations for a Cuban contingency, at least until
Castro's reaction became known; in essence, Tasks 33c and 33d
result in plans that produce a situation in which the US
must be prepared to go full tilt against Cuba, with all other
activities subjugated to the Cuban objective. At the same
time, however, Tab A shows the additive exercises, which,
if feasible, might be modified to offer an increase in
alternative exercises adaptable to other time frames.

8. In compliance with Tasks 33c and 33d as assigned,
however, the subject C&G plans have been developed using
four basic precepts:

a. The conduct of a psychological and economic harass-
ment of an unfriendly government exploiting both physical
and psychological military operations.
b. To attain a maximum condition of military readiness for Caribbean contingency operations while conducting this exploitation.

c. Funds and forces for the execution of this plan are not limiting factors.

d. Conflicts with existing, planned or projected exercises or operations are not limiting factors.

9. Accordingly, the plan envisages three separate but concurrent and related exercises:

a. An Air/Sea assault exercise in the Caribbean area (Vieques Island), to be conducted by CINCLANT in order to test Contingency Operations Plans 314/316-61 (Cuba), while maintaining a ready posture for emergency Guantanamo augmentation, should such augmentation be required.

(1) If feasible and appropriate, CINCLANT will conduct a Weapons Demonstration as a part of the Vieques operation showing recent modernization advances in armament, equipment, and procedures to invited high level, friendly Latin American officials. This may be utilized in US interests to show other Western Hemisphere powers the overt portions of this exercise, thus tying these other country representatives into a vocal defense of US friendly intentions.

b. A concurrent CINCLANT loading and deployment exercise along and off the East and Gulf coasts of the US, also to test the readiness factors of CINCLANT OPLANS 314/316-61; to include a related readiness alert of additional CINCSTRIKE augmenting forces designated in OPLANS 314/316-61 which might not be participating in the coastal exercises. Additionally, the actual deployment of those CINCPAC forces designated in CINCLANT OPLANS 314/316-61 would lend credence to the deception story, and heighten the illusion of threat
when reported transiting the Panama Canal. This deployment will also serve to preposition these forces in the Caribbean area should execution of Cuban contingency Oplans be ordered by higher authority.

c. A concurrent CINCONAD air defense exercise to test the air defense of the southeastern US, with predetermined flight paths designed to harass the present unfriendly Cuban government.

16. The three concurrent exercises are considered applicable to Task 33c and might well excite a counter-alert possibly involving the call-up of Cuban military forces (particularly the Militia), thus resulting in the disruption of the available labor force during the latter portion of the harvest period.

14. The alternative plan, Task 33d, envisages but two separate yet concurrent and related exercises, to be melded into those exercises now planned by the Unified and Specified Commanders:

   a. Execution by CINCLANT, of a small scale test of Oplan 314-61 in the Camp LeJeune/Camp Davis area of North Carolina. Planning for this exercise (QUICK KICK) is currently underway; estimated date of execution during the period 29 April - 13 May 1962. This date would have to be stepped up to more closely coincide with the harvest period, placing execution about 15 March - 1 April 1962 (still in the latter days of the harvest). While this exercise utilizes only a small portion of Oplan 314/316-61 forces, it might serve as a vehicle with which to harass Castro at a more comfortable distance. To bolster this exercise, the JCS would direct CINCSHORE to alert all remaining STRIKECOM forces not participating in CINCLANT's modified exercise "QUICK KICK" in the Camp LeJeune/Camp Davis area on a test basis.
b. Concurrently, CINCONAD, supported by additional
CINCLANT forces, will conduct an air defense exercise
(CONAD C&D PLAN "BROAD SHOULDERS"), which, as modified in
distance of participating aircraft tracks from the Cuban
land mass, etc., still affords a provocative harassment
feature.

c. Additionally, other steps to be taken concurrently
with the execution of "QUICK KICK" and "BROAD SHOULDERS",
thus adding to the credibility of US action against Cuba
(some also to be taken in conjunction with the basic C&D
Plan of Task 33c), include:

(1) Evacuation of selected civilians, including
dependents, from Guantanamo.

(2) Land the Marine Battalion of the Ready Caribbean
PHIBRON at Guantanamo for "Rest and Recreation"
(Alternative plan only).

(3) Increase air traffic in the Cuban area by
scheduling extra flights from the Florida area.

(4) Naval harassment can be instituted to a certain
extent.

(5) Signal and communications harassment will be
instituted to disrupt and divert.

(6) Unusual Washington, D.C., activities will be
suggested; i.e., Special White House/JCS meetings; the
recall to Washington of CINCLANT and senior diplomatic
representatives for White House conferences, etc.

(7) "Heckler" flights with high performance aircraft
moving toward Cuba at high altitudes, then diving to low
altitudes when closed to about 30 miles of the Cuban
coast and returning to home base. Additional flight
patterns will reverse the procedure, going out low and
returning high.
(b) Acceleration of Guantanamo re-supply, both surface
and air. Basically, the two C&D Outline plans present a wide
spectrum of possible military application,
while it may accomplish the objective of economic harassment,
and it may initiate an irrational Cuban response or reaction,
thus provoking overt hostilities; but places the US in a
favorable military posture should active US military action
or intervention in Cuba become desirable or necessary.
The three unfavourable military positions, thus necessitating an extremely costly,
gravely provocative, thus necessitating an extremely costly,
semi-mobilized military position.

1. Analysis of the basic C&D Plan recognizes that
the C&D 33c Plan recognizes that
13. Accordingly, although the Cover and Deception 33-C and 33-D Plans are forwarded in compliance with CSG (WG) Tasks 33c and 33d, it is concluded that:

a. The necessary scope of any major military Cover and Deception (C&D) effort required to disrupt the 1962 sugar harvest period, is not commensurate with the possible effects to be gained; however, such C&D effort may be appropriate and applicable to other missions and tasks of the Caribbean Survey Group.

b. The first phase of a US endeavor to cause the overthrow of the Castro Government should include the creation of a condition of unrest by covert means rather than the active use of major military forces, if practicable.

c. After a modicum of revolutionary feeling or action has been created by subversion, sabotage or other means, a C&D plan of major proportions can be used in a comprehensive, thoroughly planned, and coordinated Cover and Deception effort to initiate a second phase; including overt military intervention.

d. The Cover and Deception plans and forces involved should be used to:

(1) Create the required psychological build-up of the desired atmosphere in Cuba.

(2) Gain the necessary favorable prepositioned US military posture to counter a possible hostile Cuban reaction.

(3) Then lure or provoke Castro, or an uncontrollable subordinate, into an overt hostile reaction against the United States; a reaction which would in turn create the justification for the US to not only retaliate but destroy Castro with speed, force and determination.
e. The Cover and Deception 33-C Plan presents advantages through the prepositioning and alerting effected and being considerably stronger in purpose and larger in scope, is considered much more acceptable than the Cover and Deception 33-D Plan. Consequently the execution or implementation of 33-D is discouraged.

14. It is therefore recommended that:
   a. The attached Cover and Deception 33-C and 33-D Plans be accepted as fulfilling the requirements of CSG (WG) Tasks 33c and 33d.
   b. That any policy decision considering the implementation of either plan or any similar plan involving the use of major US military forces for Cover and Deception (C&D) purposes defer implementation or execution until future circumstances indicate a more propitious or appropriate time frame; a time when the aims of a covert first phase have been realized and the remaining objective is to destroy Castro and his government through use of force.
THE CUBA PROJECT

The Goal. In keeping with the spirit of the Presidential memorandum of 30 November 1961, the United States will help the people of Cuba overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.

The Situation. We still know too little about the real situation inside Cuba, although we are taking energetic steps to learn more. However, some salient facts are known. It is known that the Communist regime is an active Sino-Soviet spearhead in our Hemisphere and that Communist controls inside Cuba are severe. Also, there is evidence that the repressive measures of the Communists, together with disappointments in Castro's economic dependency on the Communist formula, have resulted in an anti-regime atmosphere among the Cuban people which makes a resistance program a distinct and present possibility.

Time is running against us. The Cuban people feel helpless and are losing hope fast. They need symbols of inside resistance and of outside interest soon. They need something they can join with the hope of starting to work surely towards overthrowing the regime. Since late November, we have been working hard to re-orient the operational concepts within the U.S. government and to develop the hard intelligence and operational assets required for success in our task.

The next National Intelligence Estimate on Cuba (NIE 85-62) promises to be a useful document dealing with our practical needs and with due recognition of the sparsity of hard facts. The needs of the Cuba project, as it goes into operation, plus the increasing U.S. capability for intelligence collection, should permit more frequent estimates for our guidance. These will be prepared on a periodic basis.

Promise of Action. Americans once ran a successful revolution. It was run from within, and succeeded because there was timely and strong political, economic, and military help by nations outside who supported our cause. Using this same concept of revolution from within, we must now help the Cuban people to stamp out tyranny and gain their liberty.

On 18 January, the Chief of Operations assigned thirty-two tasks to Departments and Agencies of the U.S. government, in order to provide a realistic assessment and preparation of U.S. capabilities. The Attorney General and the Special Group were apprised of this action. The answers received on 15 February provided the basis for planning a realistic course of action. The answers also revealed that the course of action must contain continuing coordination and firm overall guidance.

The course of action set forth herein is realistic within present operational estimates and intelligence. Actually, it represents the maximum target timing which the operational people jointly considered feasible. It aims for a revolt which can take place in Cuba by October 1962. It is a

(Excluded from automatic regrading: DOD Dir 5200.10 does not apply. SENSITIVE)

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 (bk_a12356-175)
series of target actions and dates, not a rigid time-table. The target dates are timed as follows:


Phase II, Build-up, April-July 1962. Activating the necessary operations inside Cuba for revolution and concurrently applying the vital political, economic, and military-type support from outside Cuba.

Phase III, Readiness, 1 August 1962, check for final policy decision.

Phase IV, Resistance, August-September 1962, move into guerrilla operations.

Phase V, Revolt, first two weeks of October 1962. Open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime.


Plan of Action. Attached is an operational plan for the overthrow of the Communist regime in Cuba, by Cubans from within Cuba, with outside help from the U.S. and elsewhere. Since this is an operation to prompt and support a revolt by the people in a Communist police state, flexibility is a must for success. Decisions on operational flexibility rest with the Chief of Operations, with consultation in the Special Group when policy matters are involved. Target actions and dates are detailed in the attached operational plans, which cover:

A. Basic Action Plan Inside Cuba
B. Political Support Plan
C. Economic Support Plan
D. Psychological Support Plan
E. Military Support Plan
F. Sabotage Support Plan
G. Intelligence Support Plan

Early Policy Decisions. The operational plan for clandestine U.S. support of a Cuban movement inside Cuba to overthrow the Communist regime is within policy limits already set by the President. A vital decision, still to be made, is on the use of open U.S. force to aid the Cuban people in winning their liberty. If conditions and assets permitting a revolt are achieved in Cuba, and if U.S. help is required to sustain this condition, will the U.S. respond promptly with military force to aid the Cuban revolt? The contingencies under which such military deployment would be needed, and recommended U.S. responses, are detailed in a memorandum being prepared by the Secretaries of State and of Defense. An early decision is required, prior to deep involvement of the Cubans in this program.
Distribution:

Copy No.

1. The President.
2. The Attorney General
3. General Taylor
4. The Secretary of State
   (through Deputy Under Secretary Johnson)
5. The Secretary of Defense
   (through Deputy Secretary Gilpatric)
6. The Director, Central Intelligence Agency
7. The Director, U. S. Information Agency
   (through Deputy Director Wilson)
8. State (Mr. Goodwin)
10. CIA (Mr. Harvey)
# Operation in Cuba

## Phase I
(March, 1962)

### Purpose
- Explore operational conditions and requirements. Report on potential and active resistance elements and situation for exploitation by resistance teams. Lay groundwork for bringing in additional agents and teams as conditions warrant.

### Considerations
- Agent operations must stay alive, make useful contacts and communicate securely with CIA. Risk to the personnel is substantial due to lack of intelligence, but mission is essential to planning and operations.

### March
- Establish three "pathfinder" agent operations in key areas selected by CIA.

## Phase II
(April-July 1962)

### Purpose
- Report on resistance potential and lay groundwork for additional agent operations.

### Considerations
- These additional teams should provide current reporting on major Cuban areas, so broad political action program can be planned. Risk to teams will continue high, but mission is essential.

### April
- Establish up to five more agent operations in key areas selected by CIA.
OPERATION IN CUBA

APRIL (cont.)

b. "Voice" of Cuban movement goes on the air.

Establishes vital psychological assurance to people that a movement exists to overthrow the regime.

MAY

c. Re-supply agent operations as necessary.

Deliver supplies to satisfy needs developed by agent operations, if valid.

CONSIDERATIONS

Preferably, the "voice" should be from mobile transmitter inside Cuba. Broadcasts can be brief ones at first: identifying music, slogan, and short news. News to include reports on "resistance" acts, taking credit for all sabotage. As daily broadcasts are established, "criminals against people" should be named and promised swift justice, two names per broadcast. If operational judgment dictates.


It is vital to take risks by having it inside Cuba; a second transmitter and crew should be moved in if the first is lost.

The agents will have to prove to local partisans that outside support is a reality. Thus, arms, ammunition, and equipment, etc., are needed to equip resistance groups, we must be able to respond effectively to these needs. Maritime and, as feasible, air re-supply will be used. This capability will have to expand as resistance is developed.
A. BASIC PLAN
PHASE II (cont.)

OPERATION IN CUBA

d. By June establish 12 more agent operations in key areas selected by CIA.

CONSIDERATIONS

These will be the last agent operations infiltrated into key areas from the outside. Further expansion by "pathfinders," after these teams are in, can be done from groups inside. It is likely that some of these last "pathfinders" will be replacing casualties.

JUNE

e. By June, introduce three resistance teams in areas under initial "pathfinder" surveillance, if situation is favorable.

PURPOSE

Mission is the same as for previous "pathfinder" operations.

This will test acceptance and use of the more highly trained teams that must guide development of the popular revolution within Cuba. This also will check emphasis and timing of program from viewpoint of Cuban situation.

f. Establish bases for guerrilla operations.

To have focal points, with some viability to stockpile for defensive needs and for future attack operations.

Very minor resistance actions by important population elements such as labor must be tried and groundwork laid for broader anti-regime program leading toward firm uprising program. Realism of political platform can be tested.

These bases are to be selected after on-the-ground surveys by the teams inside Cuba. Some may exist already. These will also be logistical bases, for caches and stockpiling of arms and equipment to be used by the resistance. The p.a. teams will need not only supplies for active resistance, but also should be able to provide some welfare aid (such as to families of resistance members, families affected by planta shut-down by sabogalo, etc.).
### OPERATION IN CUBA

<table>
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<tr>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
<th>CONSIDERATIONS</th>
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<tr>
<td>Establish clandestine leadership headquarters with means to communicate with all resistance elements.</td>
<td>Leadership will have been emerging and this is about the earliest date possible to establish a clandestine headquarters. It should be of a bare, field type, in the securest area possible. This can become the meaningful source of political-psychological actions, to develop Cuban will to resist and fight.</td>
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| Mission is the same as for the first resistance teams (A II above). | Experience of first resistance teams must be considered in preparing three additional teams for operations. Security of personnel is very important at this point, as the operation expands. |

### JULY

| By July establish up to 5 more resistance teams in areas prepared by "pathfinder" operations, as operationally feasible. | This requires ground surveys, selection of sites for caching of sabotage supplies, and recruitment of local underground, including members of military and communication employees. Popular support must be prepared by resistance teams. |

| Basic organization of underground in vicinity of airfields and communication centers. | To prepare the methods for sabotage against military aircraft and key communication links of the regime's security forces. |
### OPERATION IN CUBA

#### JULY (cont.)

<table>
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<th>PURPOSE</th>
<th>CONSIDERATIONS</th>
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<tr>
<td>To obtain maximum security for stepped-up infiltration.</td>
<td>Original &quot;rat-lines&quot; need to be expanded into a functioning &quot;underground railway&quot; to pass more infiltrats into interior. Means of quick alerts to danger, delaying defenses, multiple routes, coastal watchers and receivers need to be organized and activated.</td>
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<th>PURPOSE</th>
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<tr>
<td>Expand infiltration points along coast.</td>
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<td>OPERATION IN CUBA</td>
<td>PURPOSE</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AUGUST</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>m. Final check on resistance elements in Cuba.</td>
<td>To have a final look at the situation and at the means in place before giving the signal to initiate actions leading to full-scale revolt.</td>
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<th><strong>PHASE IV</strong> (August – September 1962)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AUGUST</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>n. Symbolic work slow-down.</td>
<td>To give workers a feeling of participating in the popular movement, without immediate reprisal.</td>
<td>12 August is the anniversary of the overthrow of dictator Machado. The resistance should link the Castro-Comunist with Machado and call on workers to lose one hour by slow-down methods on 12 Aug. to commemorate the overthrow of one dictator. Workers should be asked to give either one-hour by slow-down or one act of sabotage. The &quot;Voice&quot; of the movement should thank them the next day for their splendid response (to shame those who didn't participate by making them feel alone).</td>
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OPERATION IN CUBA

AUGUST (cont.)

o. Symbolic signs painted on walls: "Machado One"
   To commemorate the downfall of one remembered dictator and give a symbolic pace to the resistance.

p. By August, have actions to penetrate and subvert the regime.
   To weaken and frustrate organized actions against the popular movement.

q. Cuban paramilitary teams infiltrated to bases in the hills.
   To provide a trained guerrilla cadre upon which to form guerrilla units.

r. Guerrilla bands activated in key areas.
   To build a military striking force for the popular movement inside Cuba.

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

Timed with the symbolic work slowdown (A IV in above). Spaced a few days apart, the signs should have lines added to them to read:
"Machado One
Batista Two
Castro Three."

These are actions on officials of the regime, including the military and the police. Some should be detected in place. Others should be detected and helped to escape to the outside world to tell the inside story of the regime's tyranny, to evoke world sympathy with the freedom fighters.

The paramilitary teams must be capable of initiating minor harassment and reprisal actions, as well as organizing and training guerrilla units. Popular support is essential.

Recruits will be coming in after the symbolic harassment and reprisal actions. They will be screened, organized, and trained for guerrilla action. The regime's security forces can be expected to be very active. Anti-tank and anti-aircraft tactics are necessary. Increased popular support is a must in this phase.
A. BANDIT ACTION PLAN

PHASE IV (cont.)

OPERATION IN CUBA

SEPTEMBER

1. Commence expanding underground to every locality in Cuba.

2. To have a truly revolutionary organization throughout Cuba.

3. The guerrillas are the open arm, but the popular movement must have mass support, which requires intelligence collection and clandestine activists in cities and towns throughout. They will surface when the revolt needs open support.

4. Start entry of volunteer “freedom fighters” from Latin America and elsewhere.

5. To let the Cuban people know that they are not alone in their struggle against tyranny, by the physical presence of foreign “freedom fighters.”

6. A “Martí Battalion” might be formed for foreign volunteers. Recruits from Latin America, from refugee groups (such as Hungarians, Poles, etc.), and Americans, need a controlled means of entering the good fight. Some veterans of the HU campaign could be a gesture and a practical one.
OPERATION IN CUBA

PHASE IV (cont.)

SEPTEMBER (cont.)

PHASE V

(FIRST TWO WEEKS, OCTOBER 1962)

OCTOBER

a. General strike by the Cuban workers.

To make public the popular support of the militant revolt, signifying the passing from underground to open rebellion.

Strike must tie-up transportation and communications. The resistance teams must have set the readiness of the workers for this defiance of the regime. Arms must be available. Military cells will be activated. Funds will be needed to help the workers hold on and to bait defections of groups.

b. Anti-regime demonstrations.

Same purpose as noted above (A V a) for the general strike.

The resistance teams must have set the readiness of all population elements (youth, farmers, Church, etc.) to openly defy the regime. Arms must be available, including anti-tank weapons. Military cells will be activated.

c. Declaration of the revolt.

To initiate the hour of decision by calling on all Cubans for open support.

Since the aims of the liberation will have been publicized previously, this is the "go" signal. All Cubans and the world need to bear it.
A. BAY OF PIGS ACTION PLAN

PHASE V (cont.)

OPERATION IN CUBA

OCTOBER (cont.)

d. Open revolt by the Cuban people.

e. Return of Cuban refugees who are qualified and want to help liberate their homeland.

PURPOSE

To overthrow the Communist regime.

To start a more open movement back to Cuba of those Cuban refugees who are able and willing to risk their lives in overthrowing the Communist regime.

CONSIDERATIONS

This is the combat phase, fighting to take and hold ground.

Cuban refugee organizations will be tested with a "put up or shut up" proposition. Those who have ability to contribute to the popular movement inside Cuba should be given a chance to go home and act. Their recruiting and infiltration will have to be controlled. It must be a joining-in, not a taking-over of the inside movement.

PHASE VI

(DURING OCTOBER 1962)

a. Establish a new Cuban government, which can be recognized by the U.S.

To give legality to the moral right of the Cuban revolt.

When the popular movement is holding meaningful territory in Cuba, it should form a provisional government. This should permit open Latin American and U.S. help, if requested and necessary. A military government situation will exist for the initial period and we must insist upon realism in this interim period preceding reasonable civilian control.
B. POLITICAL SUPPORT PLAN

ACTIVITY

1. Use OAS and its organs.


PURPOSE

1. To reaffirm strong official condemnation of Communist rule in Cuba. To influence Latin American and world opinion against Communist grab of Cuba and favorably toward Cubans recapturing their freedom.

2. To enlist world opinion for plight of Cuban people under domination of a foreign sponsored government. Build hostility to Communist regime and a favorable attitude to people's revolt. Develop basis for outside support of Cuban people.

3. Indicate policy and commit prestige of U.S. government to appropriate support of the Cuban people vs. Communist dictatorship.

CONSIDERATIONS

OAS members must be firm and open about this being a regional concern. OAS must build support for the cause of the Cuban people against the Communist regime, by statements and reports about the police state methods and foreign domination in Cuba. This will require official and personal diplomacy with a real sense of mission, and must be an effort by Latin American as well as U.S. officials. (State responsibility, with CIA and USAID support.)

Statements of world leaders for humanity and justice can come from speeches and comments about misery of Cuban people under Communist political-economic program. Plight of trade unionism, religion, health, education all fall within UN interest. Phoney Communist maneuvers about persecution of Castro regime can open way for a challenge to a UN inquiry team from OAS states re the true status of popular support within Cuba. A challenge to hold free elections under UN monitor could be timely and place Cuban Communists on the defensive. A UN "aid for Cuban poverty and health" would be sound move to highlight situation. (State responsibility.)

Top officials of Executive and Legislative branches can keep pressure upon Castro regime directly by timely statements. This also supports similar attitude by leaders of other nations and helps spirit of Cubans. Development of sympathy leading to favorable opinion about outside support for Cuban people is...
B. POLITICAL SUPPORT PLAN
(cont.)

ACTIVITY

4. Use U.S. diplomatic and staffs in official and other contacts.

5. Activate Latin American leaders, government and public.

PURPOSE

To influence attitude of political leaders favorably for the Cuban people and hostile to Communist dictatorship. To influence key staffs of foreign leaders along same line and, as appropriate, influence leaders in intellectual and major population groups.

Commit national prestige and power of Latin political, intellectual, labor, youth, religious, military leaders to cause of Cuban people against Communist regime. For own public impact, international support, and morale of resistance within Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

Personal influence upon foreign officials is vital to build sympathy and support for Cuban revolution against Castro regime. Can lead to independent actions by other nations to build the case for the Cuban people. Latin American nations are most important, but NATO also important. Official attitude of Spanish government can be key to operational values in homeland ties to Spanish colony in Cuba. (State responsibility, with support by others as required.)

Timely and strong public statements will be encouraged. Maximum publicity at country of origin, other key countries and into Cuba by CIA assets. (State responsibility, with support by CIA and USIA.)
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<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Considerations</th>
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<tr>
<td>8. Use exile groups under Cuban Revolutionary Council.</td>
<td>To maintain a significant symbol of special groupings for contacts within Cuba and impact upon Latin American public opinion.</td>
<td>Special groupings such as students, youth, professions, women are under the CRC and must be used with care and avoid political imprint of CRC to maximum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Use exiles as touring teams for political action in Latin America.</td>
<td>To give personal witness against the Communist regime and ask support for the people recapturing their freedom.</td>
<td>Teams of students, lawyers, ex-Castro associates can tell impressive story that is newsworthy.</td>
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### C. ECONOMIC SUPPORT PLAN

<table>
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<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
<th>CONSIDERATIONS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Persuade QAS, NA, O, and countries friendly to freedom to desist from trading with the Communist dictatorship in Havana.</td>
<td>To build anti-regime feelings among Cuban people, by economic squeeze.</td>
<td>The regime may be weakened as the Cuban dollar market is depleted through loss of credit line. Requires full cooperation of allies and friends. (State responsibility with CIA and Commerce.)</td>
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<td>2. Stop trans-shipment of U.S. items to Cuba, especially via Mexico and Canada.</td>
<td>To reduce supply of items and parts critical to the Cuban regime’s economic program.</td>
<td>Target is Cuban sugar economy, power plants, communications, transport. (State responsibility with CIA, Commerce, Justice.)</td>
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<td>3. A “positive list” for Latin America subject to licensing procedures for other parts of the Free World.</td>
<td>To reduce supply of special interest items.</td>
<td>(Responsibility of State with Commerce and CIA participating.)</td>
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<td>5. Obtain cooperation of National Foreign Trade Council in delaying or refusing charters to vessels calling at Cuban ports, by mid-March.</td>
<td>To reduce supplies the Cuban regime must have to keep economy going.</td>
<td>(Responsibility of State, with Commerce and CIA participating.)</td>
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<td>7. Obtain by mid-March the cooperation of U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers to influence U.S. firms having subsidiaries abroad to adhere to the spirit of U.S. economic boycott of Cuban regime.</td>
<td>To harass Cuban economy.</td>
<td>(Responsibility of State, with Commerce and CIA participating.)</td>
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<td>ACTIVITY</td>
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<th>ACTIVITY</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Create atmosphere of a &quot;crusade&quot; for human liberty.</td>
<td>To set the deeply moving tone and motivating force for the liberation of Cuba.</td>
<td>All media. This means maximum use of spiritual appeal (such as the prayer for Cuba by Bishop Boja Mavdelal who has a genuine Cuban revolutionary background), recapturing the ideal of Marti by taking use of his memory away from the Communists (even to issue of commemorative U.S. stamp), and popularizing songs by commercial recordings. (USIA and CIA responsibility.)</td>
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<td>3. In March, commence visits of prominent U.S. and Latin American personalities to Cuban refugee camps in Florida.</td>
<td>To demonstrate concern for plight of refugees, particularly parentless children.</td>
<td>Mrs. Kennedy would be especially effective in visiting children refugees. (One camp near Miami has about 1,000 children who came out without their parents.) Her impact upon Latin Americans on the recent Presidential visit to Venezuela and Colombia suggests this. (USIA responsibility.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Publicity for selected defectors from Castro team.</td>
<td>To demonstrate Cuban regime's failure to live up to promises of original 26th of July movement.</td>
<td>Feature stories, documentaries, etc. (USIA responsibility, with help of CIA, Justice, and State.)</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### D. PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT PLAN (cont.)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
<th>CONSIDERATIONS</th>
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<tr>
<td>5. Publication of weekly reports with human-interest stories about Cuban refugees, starting in March.</td>
<td>To illuminate intolerable conditions in Cuba and the plight of the Cubans who remain inside.</td>
<td>This should include supporting reports giving statistics on the numbers of refugees who have fled, and keep fleeing, to the U.S., Jamaica, Venezuela, Mexico, and Spain. (USIA responsibility, with support of others as required.)</td>
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<td>7. Dramatic, individual stories of Cuban refugees representative of major population groups: workers, youth, farmers, fishermen, women, church.</td>
<td>To publicize that ordinary citizens, not just the rich, have fled tyranny.</td>
<td>Documentaries, etc., of these refugees now at work in the U.S. (not just in refugee centers), awaiting the day they can return to strike a blow for liberty. (USIA responsibility.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Considerations</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Provide logistic, personnel and training support.</td>
<td>To insure optimum implementation of the basic plan.</td>
<td>The basic plan requires complete and efficient support of the military, to include the use of facilities and military cover. (Defense responsibility.)</td>
</tr>
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G. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PLAN

ACTIVITY

1. Special Operations Room fully activated, by 1 March 1962


3. Develop additional interrogation centers in other areas, during March 1962.

4. Expand special intelligence and other sensitive intelligence coverage, as required.

PURPOSE

To provide the Chief of Operations and the project team with current intelligence and daily developments. To provide top U.S. officials with status briefings, as useful.

To collect intelligence required for the operations, to identify and earmark assets as refugees arrive, and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

To collect intelligence in a Latin atmosphere, at different levels than now seem possible in the continental U.S., to spot additional assets for the operation, and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

To develop increased "hard" intelligence.

CONSIDERATIONS

A maximum security room for this project will be maintained in the inner JCS security area of the Pentagon. (Defense responsibility, with support by CIA and others as required.)

This operation, in response to early recommendation as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with a new building completed and occupied, and with a staff of 42 at work. The staff is now being increased in phases, as quickly as personnel are trained, to supplement the initial staff of 9. (CIA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, State, USIA.)

As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, as first priority, CIA must survey means and methods for activating other interrogation centers where useful. [Redacted] should be included in this survey. The new centers should be activated as quickly as feasible. (CIA responsibility, with support by Defense and others as necessary.)

(Defense responsibility, in collaboration with CIA.)
G. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PLAN  
(cont.)

PURPOSE

To exploit the intelligence possibilities of former residents of Cuba (including U.S. citizens) now in the United States.

To add to the increased U.S. intelligence coverage on Cuba and to strengthen the concern of Latin American states for security.

To up-date NIE 25-62, so that current estimates can be considered at national policy levels.

CONSIDERATIONS

There are "colonies" in Washington, D.C., and other U.S. cities which are "little Cubas." Family, Church, and business interests provoke unusual personal ties inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise available. (Justice/FBI responsibility, with support from CIA and others as required.)

(Responsibility of Defense, with support by others as required.)

As the operations develop, there will be both increased intelligence collection and a need for as current an Intelligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully. It is likely that a more informal method of producing an Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be followed. (CIA responsibility, with support of others as required.)
9 March 1962

UNCLASSIFIED

REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

CUBA PROJECT (TS)

The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requested
that he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on this matter by 11 March 1962.
JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (TS)

THE PROBLEM

1. As requested* by Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but precise description of pretext, which they consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. It is recognized that any action which becomes pretext for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political decision which then would lead to military action.

3. Cognizance has been taken of a suggested course of action proposed** by the US Navy relating to generated instances in the Guantanamo area.

4. For additional facts see Enclosure B.

DISCUSSION

5. The suggested course of action appended to Enclosure A are based on the premise that US military intervention will result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which place the United States in the position of suffering justifiable grievances. World opinion, and the United Nations forum should be favorably affected by developing the international image of the Cuban government as rash and irresponsible, and as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of the Western Hemisphere.

6. While the foregoing premise can be utilized at the present time it will continue to hold good only as long as there can be reasonable certainty that US military intervention in Cuba would not directly involve the Soviet Union. There is

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* Memorandum for General Craig, from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, subject: "Operation MONROSE", dated 7 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.

** Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from Chief of Naval Operations, subject: "Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)", dated 8 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.
as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the Warsaw Pact, nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore, since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of the Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the time frame of the next few months.

CONCLUSION

7. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However, these suggestions should be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputs from other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan to focus all efforts on the objective of justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended that:

a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and transmittal to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project.

b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which responds to a request* of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.

3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be given the primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended that this responsibility for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

* Memorandum for Gen Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, subject, "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, on file in Gen Craig's office.
APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT

Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)

1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. The individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.

3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate objective which would provide adequate justification for US military intervention. Such a plan would enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other countries as well as the United States. The plan would also properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to be pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere.
4. Time is an important factor in resolution of the Cuban problem. Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that projects would be operable within the next few months.

5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military intervention, it is recommended that primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the plan for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order. Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are intended to provide a point of departure for the development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably to the objective of adequate justification for US military intervention in Cuba).

1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c, could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.

2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.

a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order):


2. Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence" to stage attack on base.

3. Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base.

4. Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans).
(5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
(6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base.
Some damage to installations.
(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Guantanamo City.
(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.
(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -- naphthalene.
(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for mock-victims (may be lieu of (10)).

b. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.

c. Commence large scale United States military operations.

3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in several forms:

a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.

b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to "rescue" remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.

4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.
The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.

5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night. Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would be found, or intercepted, on the beach.

6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modifying an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could be produced from US resources in about three months.
7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.

8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering: a non-scheduled flight.

   a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone.

   b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba the drone will be transmitting on the international distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ECU radio...
stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to "sell" the incident.

9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack.

a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba. Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the Cuban MIGs.

b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft. While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that he had been jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would resume his proper identity and return to his normal place of business. The pilot and aircraft would then have disappeared.

c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as they knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched and parts of aircraft found.
ENCLOSURE B

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated* that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon which to base overt intervention.

2. The need for positive action in the event that current covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are unsuccessful was indicated** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 March 1962, as follows:

"...determination that a credible internal revolt is impossible of attainment during the next 9-10 months will require a decision by the United States to develop a Cuban "provocation" as justification for positive US military action."

3. It is understood that the Department of State also is preparing suggested courses of action to develop justification for US military intervention in Cuba.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which responds to a request of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.

3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be given the primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended that this responsibility for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1 Enclosure
Memo for Chief of Operations, Cuba Project

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

NORTHWOODS (S)

A report* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat

* Not reproduced herewith; on file in Joint Secretariat

EXCLUDED FROM GDS
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
At their meeting on 28 March 1965, the Department of Health approved the recommendations in Paragraph 6 of the 1965 Report.

It was decided that the new primary care network, theHurts Corps in this matter, the provision of new 101巡回医 to each (C), applied and were followed.

A further discussion took place on the draft plan as attached at the top sheet of Doc. 586/521.

Dr. V. A. Bourn

Deputy Director

United States Public Health Service

UNCLASSIFIED
9 March 1962

UNCLASSIFIED

REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

CUBA PROJECT(TS)

The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requested
that he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on this matter by 13 March 1962.

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (TS)

THE PROBLEM

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2. It is recognized that any action which becomes pretext for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political decision which then would lead to military action.

3. Cognizance has been taken of a suggested course of action proposed** by the US Navy relating to generated instances in the Guantanamo area.

4. For additional facts see Enclosure B.

DISCUSSION

5. The suggested course of action appended to Enclosure A are based on the premise that US military intervention will result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which place the United States in the position of suffering justifiable grievances. World opinion, and the United Nations forum should be favorably affected by developing the international image of the Cuban government as rash and irresponsible, and as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of the Western Hemisphere.

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* Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.
** Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from Chief of Naval Operations, subject: "Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)", dated 8 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.
as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the Warsaw Pact, nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore, since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of the Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the time frame of the next few months.

CONCLUSION

7. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However, these suggestions should be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputs from other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan to focus all efforts on the objective of justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended that:
   a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and transmittal to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project.
   b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.
   c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.
   d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which responds to a request* of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.

3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be given the primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended that this responsibility for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

* Memorandum for Gen Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, subject, "Operation Mongoose", dated 5 March 1962, on file in Gen Craig's office

Enclosure A
APPENDIX TO ENCLOSED

DRAFT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT

Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)

1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereeto are forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. The individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.

3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate objective which would provide adequate justification for US military intervention. Such a plan would enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other countries as well as the United States. The plan would also properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to be pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere.

Appendix to Enclosure A
4. Time is an important factor in resolution of the Cuban problem. Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that projects would be operable within the next few months.

5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military intervention, it is recommended that primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the plan for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
NOTES

1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate
provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba
a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary
actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 o,
could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban
reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the
Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military
posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid
change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.

2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned
to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine
appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.

a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in
chronological order):

(1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.

(2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence"
to stage attack on base.

(3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the
base.

(4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly
Cubans).
(5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
(6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base. Some damage to installations.
(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Guantanamo City.
(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.
(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -- naphthalene.
(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for mock-victims (may be lieu of (10)).

b. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.

c. Commence large scale United States military operations.

3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in several forms:
   a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.
   b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.

4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.
The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.

5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night. Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would be found, or intercepted, on the beach.

6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as supplementary actions. An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modifying an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could be produced from US resources in about three months.
7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.

8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-scheduled flight.

   a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone.

   b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba the drone will be transmitting on the international distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio
stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to "sell" the incident.

9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MiGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack.

   a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba. Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the Cuban MiGs.

   b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft. While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that he had been jumped by MiGs and was going down. No other calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would resume his proper identity and return to his normal place of business. The pilot and aircraft would then have disappeared.

   c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as they knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched and parts of aircraft found.

Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A
ENCLOSURE B

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated* that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon which to base overt intervention.

2. The need for positive action in the event that current covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are unsuccessful was indicated** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 March 1962, as follows:

   " - - determination that a credible internal revolt is impossible of attainment during the next 9-10 months will require a decision by the United States to develop a Cuban "provocation" as justification for positive US military action."

3. It is understood that the Department of State also is preparing suggested courses of action to develop justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

* JCS 1969/303
** JCS 1969/313
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

By: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Meeting with President, 16 March 1962

Present: The President, General Taylor, the Attorney General, McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer, Mr. McConne, Alexis Johnson, myself. At the White House, 1600 hours, 16 March 1962.

Prior to the President's arrival, the group met in the Oval room. General Taylor handed out his "Guidelines for Operation Mongoose," dated 14 March. I asked McConne about having Helms and Harvey, who were waiting outside, join us. McConne asked if I had any differences of opinion with them. I said that we were in agreement on operational procedures, as far as the guidelines would permit operations. McConne then said Helms and Harvey should stay outside (which he told the President later, also).

McConne then asked me if I were in agreement with the concept contained in the "Guidelines." I commented that they didn't fit the conditions inside Cuba that were becoming more apparent to the operational people, including CIA operators for whom I had respect; the chance of fracturing the regime and creating a valid revolution is becoming more feasible. I felt that we needed much more freedom to work on the revolutionary possibilities than is possible under the guidelines.

The President then came in.

General Taylor gave a brief report on developments since 30 November, said the Special Group felt that hard intelligence was needed before going ahead, and handed the President a copy of the revised Guidelines.
(The President glanced at this momentarily and set it down on the table; Taylor had briefed him on the Guidelines the evening before.) The President then turned to me and asked me what was being done.

I gave him a quick summary of the intelligence-collection plan through July, telling him that this was the Special Group's plan, and describing the work so far of CIA and Defense. I told him that we finally were starting to get a really good team together for the operation, after much effort to get the U.S. pointed in the right direction. I noted that agents were to be trained or experienced in guerrilla warfare, that we needed U.S. military participation for support, including air re-supply and maritime actions. He asked for details. Both General Lemnitzer and I told him about "sheep-dipping" U.S. military personnel, "sanitizing" equipment, and use of U.S. bases. I pointed out that PT boat silhouettes required a Navy base as cover, even if we called it "R&E," that air re-supply would be done at night from about 800-feet which entailed some risk which the Air Force was now assessing. He asked about maritime runs of the PT-boats; I explained our problems of "mother" ships, the LSD's and 200-300 man crews, which we are trying to lick.

I remarked that the thesis of creating a revolution inside Cuba looked just as valid as ever, and that CIA professionals were now agreeing more and more that both resistance and the possibility of fracturing the regime pointed to some real opportunities. I noted that we were checking out a number of leads, including relatives of Fidel Castro, to assess the practical opportunities for splitting away some of the regime. If we could get some of the top Cuban leaders, and some units of the Cuban security forces to take to the hills, we would have conditions which would need quick exploitation -- and we would have to be ready for this. I noted that we would have to supply arms and equipment; it is possible that this could be done without U.S. military intervention, but we must be ready to intervene with U.S. forces, if necessary.

The President asked if U.S. military intervention was an issue which the Special Group was posing to him now. Taylor and the Special Group promptly said, "no."

General Lemnitzer commented that the military had contingency plans for U.S. intervention. Also, it had plans for creating plausible pretexts to use force, with the pretexts either attacks on U.S. aircraft or a Cuban action in Latin America for which we would retaliate.
The President said bluntly that we were not discussing the use of U.S. military force, that General Lemnitzer might find the U.S. so engaged in Berlin or elsewhere that he couldn't use the contemplated 4 divisions in Cuba. So, we cannot say that we are able now to make a decision on the use of U.S. military force.

The President then commented that he hoped something could be done about the press. That the newspapers would start conjecturing on operations just as they did in April 1961. I said that such conjecture was going on all the time, that any solid-looking reports might well be a real blessing, because as talk increases that the U.S. has the intention, somehow, to help the people of Cuba regain their freedom, that the people inside would get some hope. This spiritual factor, of having hope of something better than what they are now saddled with, is vitally important at this time.

The President then asked about immigration. Wouldn't it be better to shut our doors to the people trying to get out, so that they would be forced to stay and take action against the regime? I pointed out that we still were giving them only two choices: either to escape to the U.S. and freedom, or to stay and be slaves. Once we are committed to helping them stage a revolt, provide arms, and are willing to go all the way in being sure that they win, then we might consider closing our doors -- because we then will be helping them gain their freedom at home. I Now, with 2,000 people fleeing every week, we would be foolish to remove this symbol of our sympathy and cut off the source of intelligence information and recruits. We must give the Cubans the chance and the help to free themselves.

The Attorney General then mentioned Mary Hemingway, commenting on reports that Castro was drinking heavily in disgustment over the way things were going, and the opportunities offered by the "shrine" to Hemingway. I commented that this was a conversation Ed Murrow had had with Mary Hemingway, that we had similar reports from other sources, and that this was worth assessing firmly and pursuing vigorously. If there are grounds for action, CIA had some invaluable assets which might well be committed for such an effort. McCone asked if his operational people were aware of this; I told him that we had discussed this, that they agreed the subject was worth vigorous development, and that we were in agreement that the matter was so delicate and sensitive that it shouldn't be surfaced to the Special Group until we were ready to go, and then not in detail.
I pointed out that this all pertained to fractioning the regime. If it happened, it could develop like a brush-fire, much as in Hungary, and we must be prepared to help it win our goal of Cuba free of a Communist government.

General Lemnitzer mentioned the beach reconnaissance by the U.S. Navy, which was evaluated by the JCS as having little risk. UDT teams would do this at night, and would not need to surface.

Mr. McConc mentioned that we were including sabotage in early actions. I commented that we had a number of such actions listed, but were only planning on a few most necessary ones. One example was the Soviet patrol craft, for which both Navy and CIA were tasked to plan sabotage. The President asked how this might be done. I replied that fuel, lubricants, crews, and the patrol craft were all potential targets -- that, for example, a boat laid-up for repair was a boat that wasn't out on patrol at a critical period.

Mr. Gilpatric mentioned that Mr. McNamara was intensely interested in creating a Defense pool of resources for covert actions, for Colombia for example, so that we wouldn't be faced with the problem of only having 4 PT boats as we do for Cuba.

The meeting then broke up, with the President saying go ahead on the Guidelines. General Taylor asked for his copies of the Guidelines back. I said I needed a copy, for my guidance and to show the operators such as Harvey and Craig. The President expressed his appreciation for what had been done so far. Gen. Taylor didn't persist at getting his copy back, so I retained it.
14 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary McNamara
Deputy Secretary Gilpatric
General Lemnitzer

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

General Taylor's office telephoned this morning to say that the meeting with the President on Operation Mongoose will be at 1600 hours, Friday, 16 March, at the White House. General Taylor plans that the meeting will be with the entire Special Group (Augmented) and has asked me to inform him if you plan to attend this meeting.

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Copy No. 2 of 4 copies. A.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Cuba

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the Cuban problem must be solved in the near future. Further, they see no prospect of early success in overthrowing the present communist regime either as a result of internal uprisings or external political, economic or psychological pressures. Accordingly they believe that military intervention by the United States will be required to overthrow the present communist regime.

2. The United States cannot tolerate permanent existence of a communist government in the Western Hemisphere. The present regime in Cuba provides communism with a base of operations for espionage, sabotage and subversion against Latin America. The stability of some governments in Latin America is already threatened by the overt and covert actions of the Cuban government. Continued existence of this communist government increases the probability that one or more other nations in Latin America will become communist or communist dominated. This will greatly increase the problems currently facing the United States and the Organization of American States. While considered unlikely, it is possible for the Sino-Soviet Bloc to establish military bases in Cuba similar to US installations around the bloc periphery. Establishment of such bases would increase US defense costs as forces were developed or shifted to meet the threat.

3. Time favors the Cuban regime and the communist bloc. They are provided with the opportunity to continue with their subversive efforts in Latin America. Increasing internal security measures by police state methods decrease

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the possibility of internal uprisings within Cuba. The steady improvement in military defenses strengthens the resistance which must be overcome in the event of US military intervention and could lengthen the time required to secure control of the government and the island. The continuing indoctrination of the Cuban youth creates a growing nucleus for a communist underground after the elimination of the present government. This creates a problem for the future which is steadily increasing in magnitude.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States can undertake military intervention in Cuba without risk of general war. They also believe that the intervention can be accomplished rapidly enough to minimize communist opportunities for solicitation of UN action. Forces available would assure rapid essential military control of Cuba. Continued police action would be required.

5. In view of the increasing military and subversive threat to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere posed by the communist regime in Cuba, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a national policy of early military intervention in Cuba be adopted by the United States. They also recommend that such intervention be undertaken as soon as possible and preferably before the release of National Guard and Reserve forces presently on active duty.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. Lemnitzer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff