

[REDACTED]

This document summarises the occasions when two of the STEPFORD bombers (MSK and Shezad TANWEER) came to our attention during the CREVICE investigation and related enquiries.

Early links to Mohammed Qayum KHAN (MQK)

1. On 13 July 2003 [REDACTED] the mobile phone of Mohammed Qayum KHAN (MQK) [REDACTED] contacted the unidentified user of 07904186076 (*now known to be Mohammed Siddique KHAN*) on several occasions [REDACTED]

2. On 19 July 2003 [REDACTED] MQK's mobile [REDACTED] contacted 07792261882 [REDACTED] 07792261882. MQK made three subsequent calls [REDACTED] Incidentally, MQK contacted this individual on 07904186076 in two of their four communications that day, [REDACTED]

3. On 24 July 2003 probably MSK using 07792261882 contacted MQK [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The same [REDACTED] called MQK 45 minutes later [REDACTED]

4. On 15 August 2003 MSK (using 07904186076) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Subscribers

07904186076: SIDDIQUE KHAN: 49a Bude Road, Leeds, West Yorks, LSI 1 6HX

07792261882: Unregistered PAYG

Assessment/Action taken when reporting received

5. In the summer of 2003 we assessed MQK to be the co-ordinator of a Luton-based network of Al Qaida facilitators. He would use couriers to send money [REDACTED] to, [REDACTED] AQ operatives in Pakistan. Technical and surveillance coverage of MQK during the Spring/Summer of 2003 indicated that he was in contact with a large number of individuals. [REDACTED]

6. In 2003 we had no intelligence to indicate that MQK's facilitation network stretched beyond the Luton area, let alone as far as Leeds. [REDACTED] there was no intelligence to suggest that their [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

association was linked to AQ support activity or Islamist extremism in general. MSK was therefore regarded as one of many associates of MQK and he was not investigated further.

Malakand Training Camp - July 2003

7. In April/May 2004 reporting from Mohammed Junaid BABAR (MJB) indicated that two individuals known as IBRAHIM (now known to be MSK) and ZUBAIR (now known to be Mohammed SHAKIL) arrived at Islamabad airport in July 2003, where they were met by [REDACTED]. Co-incidentally, on the same day three Operation CREVICE targets Ahmed Ali KHAN, Jawad AKBAR and Waseem GULZAR also arrived in Islamabad with the intention of attending a training camp in Malakand. They were met at the airport by KHYAM and MJB. Members of the two groups were then introduced to each other and they had breakfast together.

8. In May 2004 [REDACTED] also highlighted the existence of IBRAHIM and ZUBAIR, who he described as originating from Leeds. The information [REDACTED] provided on the two individuals effectively mirrors that gleaned from MJB in April/May 2005 (see para.7), although he provided a couple of additional snippets. [REDACTED] stated that IBRAHIM and ZUBAIR were sent to Pakistan by MQK on a fact-finding mission about Mujahideen fighters gaining access into Afghanistan. He also mentioned that the two individuals wanted to meet senior AQ commander Abu MUNTHIR. [REDACTED] stated that MQK had left the decision as to whether IBRAHIM and ZUBAIR should travel to the tribal areas to his discretion. [REDACTED] maintained that he advised them not to travel there and instead they returned to the UK after two weeks. It has been confirmed, post 7/7, that MSK and SHAKIL departed Lahore for London on 7 August 2003.

9. During an evidential interview with SO13 in March 2005, MJB provided additional information on IBRAHIM and ZUBAIR and their visit to Pakistan. He described them as originating from Bradford and confirmed information previously provided by [REDACTED] that the two individuals had been sent to Pakistan by MQK to gain an insight into Mujahideen operations on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border. MJB also mentioned that IBRAHIM and ZUBAIR attended the Malakand training camp along with several of the CREVICE targets.

10. MJB advised that the Malakand training camp commenced in early July 2003 with the initial attendees consisting of: Omar KHYAM, Shujah Uddin MAHMOOD, Anthony GARCIA, Shiraj UI-ISLAM @ AYOUB, Zeeshan SIDDIQUE @ IMRAN, Rizwan SHAMIM @ RIAZ and Atif JALEEL @ Uni Boy. Later in July 2003 this group was joined by KHAN, AKBAR, GULZAR, Mohammed Momin KHAWAJA, MSK @ IBRAHIM and Mohammed SHAKIL @ ZUBAIR. The group were reported to have fired weapons and used rocket launchers at the camp as well as experimenting with explosives.

Assessment/Action taken when reporting received

11. The FBI provided us with notes from their debriefs of MJB in April/May 2004, which included references to IBRAHIM and ZUBAIR. However, it is important to note that these were two of many individuals named by MJB. Although the information he provided showed that they had met members of the CREVICE network in Pakistan, there was no indication that they were involved in terrorist planning or even AQ support activities. It is worth noting that MJB described other individuals who appeared far more likely to be involved in terrorist planning than IBRAHIM and ZUBAIR. It is also worth noting that the FBI debriefs were received in several parts and as scanned images. It was therefore a lengthy process to manually collate all the intelligence on each target.

[REDACTED]

12. In May 2004, the A4 surveillance photos of MSK, TANWEER and Shipon ULLAH were included in a pack of all CREVICE-related photographs sent [REDACTED] for identification purposes. However, he did not positively identify any of the three individuals. The photos of TANWEER and ULLAH were also amongst a set shown to MJB during FBI debriefs in April/May 2004. MJB did not positively identify TANWEER and ULLAH, who were depicted in the surveillance photographs. The surveillance photo of MSK was omitted from the pack shown to MJB due to its poor quality.

13. The evidential statement taken by SO 13 from MJB in March 2005 was the first time that the intelligence he provided was assembled in chronological order, which made it easier to judge the significance of each target he mentioned. In late March 2005 facts relevant to each target were collated. Recommendations were then made to [REDACTED] management that we should initiate investigations into three sets of individuals described by MJB in the statement - these included IBRAHIM and ZUBAIR. This recommendation was accepted and Operation DOWNTempo commenced on 12 April 2005 in order to fully identify and investigate IBRAHIM and ZUBAIR.

14. Several possible candidates for IBRAHIM and ZUBAIR were identified, but the identification was difficult as the above bears no resemblance to their real names and the task was further complicated as MJB erroneously reported that they were from Bradford as opposed to Leeds. In May 2005 the three Leeds-based individuals who featured in the 2 February 2004 surveillance coverage of Omar KHYAM (see para. 18) were flagged up as three of several possible candidates for IBRAHIM and ZUBAIR.

15. Despite the fact that IBRAHIM and ZUBAIR were recommended as investigative targets, the intelligence cases against them did not justify them being considered as high priority [REDACTED] targets.

Activities of 2 February 2004

16. On 28 January 2004 [REDACTED] KHYAM's phone [REDACTED] received a call from 07951364275, [REDACTED]

17. [REDACTED] Later in the day, [REDACTED] Omar KHYAM's mobile indicated that he was in contact [REDACTED] with MSK, who was using 07951364275 [REDACTED]

18. At 20:28 KHYAM and Shujah MAHMOOD in the Suzuki Vitara travelled to Langley Parade in Crawley, which is near to his home address. A few minutes later a Green Honda Civic (R840 CCA) pulled up alongside the Vitara. We now know that its three occupants were MSK, Shezad TANWEER and Shipon ULLAH. However, all three were unidentified at the time. KHYAM joined MSK in the Honda Civic and they drove around for approximately 25 minutes, possibly for the purpose of a meeting. KHYAM handed MSK a piece of paper (nfd) and all six individuals then returned to their respective vehicles. The Honda Civic proceeded north on the M1 while KHYAM and MAHMOOD probably returned to the home address.

[REDACTED]

19. A4 Surveillance followed the vehicle to Toddington Service station where photographs of ULLAH, TANWEER and MSK were taken. They were labelled Man C, D and E respectively at the time. The Honda then carried on North to Leeds where ULLAH and TANWEER were dropped off in the vicinity of addresses (a) and (b), while MSK was housed at address (c).

- a) 115 or 117 Lodge Lane, Leeds, West Yorkshire, LSI 1 6JF
- b) 115 Tempest Road, Leeds, West Yorkshire, LSI 1 6AU
- c) 10 Thornhill Park Avenue, Dewsbury, West Yorkshire, WF12 ODA

Assessment/Action taken when reporting received

20. Our assessment of Omar KHYAM at the time was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The 2 February meeting preceded the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This intelligence was received [REDACTED] February 2004 and triggered the major CREVICE investigation.

21. Our initial telephone coverage of KHYAM showed that he had many associates and used his phone regularly. [REDACTED]

22. It is important to realise that Shipon ULLAH, TANWEER and MSK were not identified at the time and were labelled Man C, D and E respectively. Furthermore, based on the intelligence available, there was no clear indication that MSK was the individual [REDACTED] back in July 2003: MSK was not listed on the voters roll at 10 Thornhill Park Avenue, the phone he used to contact KHYAM was a pre-pay mobile and the mobile he used to contact MQK in 2003 was registered to a different address in Leeds. Incidentally, post 7/7 phone record analysis shows that MSK was actually in contact with KHYAM as early as October 2003.

23. On 11 February 2004 a cluster was sent to MPSB which included details of the addresses and vehicles associated with the 'Leeds three' to date. A request for further details regarding the owner of the Honda Civic driven by MSK and the associated address (Hasina PATEL, 10 Thornhill Park Avenue, Dewsbury) was sent to West Yorkshire SB on 16 February 2004. Thornhill Park Avenue and the Honda Civic appear on a list of vehicles and addresses recommended for priority targeting by A1/A4 on 18 February 2004.

Activities of 21 February 2004

24. At 18:39 KHYAM and 2 UMs were seen to exit 92 Langley Drive (this is probably 90 Langley Drive: the home address of Waheed MAHMOOD). KHYAM and one of the UMs joined Shujah Uddin MAHMOOD and Momin KHAWAJA in the Suzuki. The other UM (strongly assessed to be Waheed MAHMOOD) boarded a White Morrisons van. Both vehicles drove south. Surveillance allowed the van to proceed and the Suzuki eventually

[REDACTED]

stopped outside 2 The Hollow (the home address of Waseem GULZAR). All four individuals entered the address.

25. Surveillance observed KHYAM and Shujah MAHMOOD leaving 2 The Hollow at 20:49. They boarded the Vitara and drove to a Kebab shop on Langley Parade. At 21:05 the Vitara returned to the area of 2 The Hollow and surveillance observed KHYAM and MAHMOOD chatting in the car until approximately 21:34, when they re-entered the address. Eavesdropping product from the device installed in the Vitara between 20:50 and 21:30 indicates the presence of a third individual in the vehicle.

26. At approximately 00:00 seven UMs and Ahmed Ali KHAN exited 2 The Hollow and boarded four separate vehicles. Three boarded a White Morrisons transit van (ND02 HLH), one of whom is almost certainly Waheed MAHMOOD. The other vehicles observed were a Blue Toyota Avensis (VRN unknown), a Silver Vauxhall Corsa (FP53 UEM) and Ahmed Ali KHAN's Blue VW Golf.

27. At 00:38 the Silver Corsa returned to 2 The Hollow, where a UM alighted and entered with a key (this could be Waseem GULZAR). At 04:58 a UM wearing a checked jacket boarded the Corsa and drove North on the A23 to Manor Royal Industrial Estate, and entered the carpark for Invenysis. Crews then handed over control of the Corsa to Police surveillance teams. At 06:07 the Corsa was seen parked empty outside 2 The Hollow.

28. At 09:18 on Sunday 22 February 2004, surveillance observed KHYAM, Shujah MAHMOOD and Momin KHAWAJA leaving 2 The Hollow. They subsequently boarded the Vitara and drove to KHYAM's flat in Slough.

Assessment/Action taken when reporting received

29. In view of the personnel who attended the meeting at 2 The Hollow, our assessment at the time was that the meeting was likely to be of significance in an Islamist extremist context and possibly relevant to the CREVICE plot. However, given that there was no audio eavesdropping device installed at the address, this is conjecture.

30. There is no mention in the surveillance report of a third individual (*now known to be MSK*) boarding the Vitara at 20:49 with KHYAM and Shujah MAHMOOD. Furthermore, surveillance observed only two individuals (KHYAM and MAHMOOD) re-entering 2 The Hollow at 21:34. The original transcript of the 40 minute conversation, which took place in the Vitara between 20:50 and 21:30, indicates that three individuals were present, referred to as UM1, UM2 and UM3. There is no mention of any individual having a Northern accent. Also, there was no telephone contact between KHYAM and MSK prior to their meeting, unlike the other four occasions when they met. It would therefore have been impossible to identify the third individual in the Vitara as MSK when the reporting was received.

31. The original transcript of the conversation is unclear and disjointed. Also, given that all three individuals are listed as UMs it is unclear which passages of speech relate to each individual. Pakistan, the tribal areas and various fraud scams are mentioned. However, given what we knew at the time (in a pre-MJB statement era) and in view of the lack of a verbatim transcript of the conversation, it was not possible to understand its true significance. Another important factor is that there was no mention of the CREVICE plot in this particular conversation, which was the primary focus at the time. As a consequence, no further work was carried out in relation to this piece of intelligence as the investigation was moving at a fast pace, identifying separate intelligence which was relevant to the CREVICE conspiracy.

Activities of 28 February 2004

32. On 28 February 2004 between 06:33 and 06:56 [REDACTED]

33. At 08:56 KHYAM and Shujah MAHMOOD in the Suzuki Vitara arrived at Sainsburys car park in Crawley and pulled up alongside the Honda Civic (see surveillance of 2 February 2004). Three unidentified males (now known to be MSK, TANWEER and 'ULLAH') entered McDonalds with KHYAM and MAHMOOD. The Suzuki and the Honda then travelled in convoy to several builders merchants in Crawley. An individual believed to TANWEER enquired about opening accounts with the companies they visited.

34. At 13:07 the two vehicles travelled to a Mosque in Slough where they stayed for approximately 40 minutes. All five individuals then travelled to 56 Hencroft Street, Slough, which is KHYAM's flat. CCTV coverage of the address showed that KHYAM was carrying a video camera. At 15:36 CCTV footage showed KHYAM, Shujah MAHMOOD, MSK, TANWEER and 'ULLAH' leaving 56 Hencroft Street.

35. After visiting the New Kabana Restaurant, all five individuals boarded the Honda Civic and travelled north on the M1 via the M25. The CREVICE log indicates that at 17:30 the Honda stopped at Junction 11 of the M1 (Luton turn-off) where MQK was waiting for them. The meeting is assessed to have lasted for only 10 minutes as [REDACTED] showed MQK entering his home address in Luton a short time after the meeting took place.

36. The Honda Civic continued travelling north on the M1 until it reached Easytalk.com, a mobile phone shop in Wellingborough, Northants which is owned by radical Imam Bisharat ALL. All five individuals entered Easytalk.com at 19:00 and left at 21:26 when the shop closed down. The group moved to Flames Restaurant in Wellingborough before returning to 56 Hencroft Street, Slough where KHYAM and Shujah MAHMOOD were dropped off. MPSB S-Squad followed the Honda back to Leeds where two individuals, probably 'ULLAH' and TANWEER were dropped off at Lodge Lane and Tempest Road. The driver, believed to be MSK, was housed at 12 or 14 Pickles Field, Batley at 03:05 on 29 February 2004.

Assessment/Action taken when reporting received

37. We were aware at the time that the three Leeds-based individuals who featured in the surveillance on 28 February 2004 were identical with Man C, D and E. ELG minutes from 28/02/04 record that the ELG was briefed to this effect. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Our assessment at the time was that the CREVICE targets were opening accounts with a number of building merchants with the intention of obtaining a large quantity of expensive building equipment on credit.

38. We believe their subsequent intention would have been to default on the repayment of the money and possibly sell the equipment to third parties for cash. The CREVICE targets would therefore have fraudulently obtained large sums of money, which they are likely to have intended to transfer to Pakistan for the benefit of senior Al Qaida commanders. This is

[REDACTED]

supported by the fraud-related discussion between the above mentioned individuals on 23 March 2004 (see para.51). We assessed that most of the other activities observed by surveillance on 28 February 2004 are likely to be innocuous.

39. The visit to Easytalk.com was interesting as it occurred after opening hours and their presence there was clearly for the purpose of having a meeting. Although it was quickly established that the shop was owned by Bisharat ALI, his significance was unknown at this time. The reporting stating that he was a radical Imam was not received by the Service from Northants SB until 6 May 2004. As a result, there was no reason to suspect that this meeting was any more suspicious than the numerous other meetings KHYAM had with various associates.

40. At this point in the investigation the focus was very much on the fertiliser plot and the investigative resource was devoted to those individuals who were clearly linked to it: Man C, D and E were not. Although this was the second occasion the Leeds three had featured, apart from KHYAM and Shujah MAHMOOD, none of the other CREVICE principles appeared to have direct links to the Leeds three.

41. On 20 March 2004 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 14 Langley Walk showed a car arriving at the address at 23:20, which was subsequently identified as MSK's hired Vauxhall Corsa (YB52 LUF). Probably MSK alighted the vehicle and rang the bell of 14 Langley Walk. Two individuals, believed to be KHYAM and Shujah MAHMOOD, left the address and all three individuals boarded the Vauxhall Corsa.

42. The Vauxhall Corsa drove around for approximately 30 minutes, returning to 14 Langley Walk at 00:51 on 21 March 2004. KHYAM, Shujah MAHMOOD and probably MSK engaged in a 10 minute conversation on the pavement outside the address. KHYAM and MAHMOOD returned to the home address at 01:00, while MSK and his unidentified passenger(s) were allowed to proceed and may have returned to Leeds.

Assessment/Action taken when reporting received

43. Our assessment at the time was that KHYAM, MAHMOOD, MSK and his associates drove around for the purpose of a meeting, which mirrors their activities on 2 February 2004. Unfortunately, there was no eavesdropping device installed in MSK's vehicle and we were therefore unable to establish what was discussed during the meeting. We maintained our assessment that the Leeds-based individuals were unlikely to be directly related to the fertiliser plot, which was clearly our prime focus at the time given that it represented a direct and credible threat to National Security.

Activities of 23 March 2004

44. On 22 March 2004 [REDACTED] KHYAM's operational mobile indicated that he contacted MSK on 07944420814 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

45. [REDACTED]

46. MPSB S-Squad observed KHYAM leaving 36 Langley Drive, Crawley with four unidentified males (now known to be Shujah MAHMOOD, MSK, TANWEER and 'ULLAH'). They visited Nadeem ASHRAF's address in Crawley before travelling to the home address of Azhar Shezad KHAN in Slough. KHAN joined KHYAM and TANWEER in the Vitara and they proceeded in convoy with MSK, Shipon ULLAH and Shujah MAHMOOD, who were travelling in a Green Vauxhall Corsa (YB52 LUF). This vehicle was hired by MSK.

47. At 13:25 [REDACTED] KHYAM's operational mobile [REDACTED] received calls on 07745909000 and 07969723498, [REDACTED]

48. At 14:45 the two vehicles travelled to Uxbridge town centre before heading to Ilford. Eavesdropping product from KHYAM's vehicle during the journey covered a lengthy conversation predominantly between KHYAM and TANWEER. Large parts of their discussion are unclear, but they did mention the importance of being physically and mentally prepared for travelling to Pakistan. A verbatim transcript of this product has not yet been produced. The six individuals mentioned in para.46 visited SS Designers, Raman Cash and Carry and the Subrung Bookshop on two separate occasions (the second visit lasted approximately 1 hour).

49. The two vehicles returned in convoy to Hencroft Street, Slough arriving at 21:11. CCTV footage showed that KHAN, Shujah MAHMOOD, TANWEER and ULLAH entered the home address while KHYAM and MSK visited the Universal Internet Cafe. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] KHYAM and MSK returned to Hencroft Street.

Assessment/Action taken when reporting received

50. Our assessment of the activities of 23 March 2004 almost mirrors that of 28 February 2004. The surveillance observed them meeting up in the morning and travelling to places that had not previously featured in the investigation i.e. the Subrung bookshop, SS Designers and Raman Cash & Carry. Similar to the conversation between KHYAM and MSK on 21 February 2004, it was not possible at the time to understand the significance of the former's conversation with TANWEER. It is worth re-iterating that the focus in March 2004 was on the CREVICE conspiracy and not individuals travelling to Pakistan. This piece of audio product was therefore judged to be irrelevant to the plot and no further action was taken.

51. The meeting later that evening was also judged not to be significant or relevant to the CREVICE plot. Although Bisharat ALI was in attendance, his significance was not known at the time. Product from the eavesdropping device indicated that the attendees mainly discussed how they could defraud various financial institutions. This appeared to tie in with their visits to the Builders Merchants on 28 February 2004. There was no direct reference to the CREVICE plot or other groups planning terrorist operations and no comments which could have been interpreted to refer to these subjects.