

1. There was reporting from MJB in April/May 2004 that 2 men called IBRAHIM and ZUBAIR travelled to Pakistan in June 2003 from the UK. That reporting included reference to Jawad AKBAR who had arrived in Islamabad with a separate group. MJB provided no information about the specific date in June or the flight taken by any of the individuals at Islamabad airport. Indeed, it was not clear from the reporting that they arrived on the same flight.
  2. Reporting from MJB in March 2005 gave further details about IBRAHIM and ZUBAIR as per the gist and reported that they arrived in Islamabad in late July 2003. This was the first time that we received reporting concerning IBRAHIM and ZUBAIR's attendance at a terrorist training camp.
  3. In order to obtain evidence of travel to Pakistan for the CREVICE defendants in preparation for the CREVICE trial in February 2006, the Met Police obtained further details of Jawad AKBAR's travel as follows:
    - a. Based upon post arrest investigations of AKBAR the Met made a formal request to the Pakistani authorities in June 2005 in the form of a mutual legal assistance request for information relating to AKBAR and six others' (all CREVICE defendants) travel to and from Pakistan. The Met had information at the time of the request that AKBAR had arrived in Pakistan on 25 July 2003. The AKBAR passport in the possession of the Metropolitan Police following the CREVICE arrests showed an entry to Pakistan on 25 July 2003.
    - b. As a result of this request by the Metropolitan Police the Pakistan immigration authorities investigated their PISCES database. PISCES is a central immigration computer system operated by the Pakistani authorities. For the request to be successful, specific information such as name, date of birth and date of travel needs to be supplied. The system does not produce a manifest list for each flight. It produces a date and time of passing through immigration control for a named individual and it may include reference to the flight that an individual arrives on.
    - c. Using the PISCES database, the Pakistani immigration authorities provided the Met Police with a witness statement dated 6 September 2005 that stated AKBAR had arrived in Islamabad on 25 July 2003 on Gulf Air flight GF434 from Abu Dhabi.
    - d. The UK authorities therefore only received information that AKBAR had arrived in Islamabad on GF434 on the 6 September 2005.
    - e. Based on this information, the Met Police made enquiries after September 2005 of Gulf Air. Given that this was after the 7 July attacks, and it had now been established that IBRAHIM was identical with MSK, the enquiry included a request for Mohammed Saddique KHAN's travel itinerary.
    - f. On 16 January 2006 Manhar Nasaria, an employee of Gulf Air, provided a written witness statement drawing on booking histories stating that Jawad AKBAR had arrived in Islamabad airport on Gulf Air flight GF434 on 25 July 2003. AKBAR had travelled from the UK to Pakistan via Bahrain and Abu Dhabi. She also stated that Mohammed Saddique KHAN, Ahmed Ali KHAN and Waseem GULZAR were on the same flight.
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4. The SyS would not have had any reason, prior to March 2005, to make a request to the Pakistani authorities for the PISCES data relating to AKBAR for intelligence purposes because we had no need to clarify AKBAR's travel itinerary for evidential purposes (as the Police did) and the MJB reporting prior to March 2005 did not indicate that IBRAHIM and ZUBAIR had attended the Malakand training camp, and so were not deemed to be significant targets.
5. In March 2005, when IBRAHIM and ZUBAIR became more significant, neither the Met Police nor the SyS were in possession of AKBAR's flight details. The steps recorded in paragraph 3 above had yet to be undertaken in order to obtain AKBAR's flight details. In addition in order to have obtained the flight details of IBRAHIM, ZUBAIR and the other individuals referred to by MJB as arriving in Islamabad, the following further steps would have needed to be taken:
  - a. Requests needed to be made of the Pakistani Immigration authorities for details of all other individuals arriving in Islamabad on 25 July 2003 because the single name provided by MJB, IBRAHIM, would not have been sufficiently specific to enable the Pakistani authorities to interrogate their immigration records. This was particularly true in this case as it was an alias. At this stage it would not have been known which flight AKBAR arrived on. All that would have been known is the date and rough time. This request would not have been proportionate.
  - b. If the details of all passengers who travelled through Islamabad airport on that day had been obtained, it would not have been feasible to filter this data by flights arriving from the UK because many passengers transited a third country as part of their journey, as had AKBAR and (as it turned out) MSK.
  - c. Based upon the information provided, the British authorities would have had to then obtain the full manifest, if available, from all potential carriers on the date and rough time available.
6. The Met Police initiated the steps outlined in para 5a. above in June 2005 in relation to AKBAR. They received a reply on 6 September 2005. There is no reason to suppose that had the SyS made the same request as the Met Police on intelligence channels that it would have received a response any sooner than the Met Police. Had the SyS made the request outlined at paragraph 5a. above in relation to all of the individuals referred to, it is reasonable to suppose that the request would have taken even longer to answer.
7. Aside from the above, it should be noted that by far the most likely lead for identification of IBRAHIM was to show photographs of those associated with CREVICE to MJB and the second detainee. This was done and both detainees failed to recognise a photograph of Man E as IBRAHIM when they could reasonably have been expected to. For this reason also, it would not have been proportionate to undertake the more speculative manifest enquiries because the lack of recognition of the Man E photograph by MJB and the second detainee had been a positive indication that Man E was not IBRAHIM.
8. SyS did not have enough specific details and it would not have been proportionate to ask the Pakistani authorities to interrogate the PISCES system to identify IBRAHIM because they only had one part of a name, which turned out to be an operational alias.